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. Each year more and more Americans are aware of the American Cancer Society, believe in what we are doing, and gener- ously contribute their time and money. This support has made us one of the larg- est and certainly among the best volunteer health agencies. And that is as it should be because we are fighting America's most devastating health problem.-Lane W. Adams, executive vice-president of the American Cancer Society One would be hard put to refute the above description of the American Cancer Soci- ety; indeed, it is one of understatement. In 1980, for example, Americans demon- strated their support of ACS's war against cancer by contributing $155 million to the organization. Some two and a half million citizens joined the cancer charity organi- zation's volunteer army, ringing doorbells, answering telephones, and licking enve- lopes and stamps. Despite this huge vol- unteer army. ACS also finds it necessary to maintain more than 3,000 full-time workers in its offices and centers around the country. Next to the United States government's- National Cancer Institute, ACS is the greatest source of funds for cancer re- search in this country. In 1980, for exam- ple, ACS supported more than 600 cancer research projects in the amount of $45 million. The amount accounted for 29 per- cent of ACS's budget in that year. Four other programs, in addition to that for cancer research, are supported with ACS dollars. Public education-programs designed to inform the public about can- cer prevention and symptoms and to en- courage periodic examinations-was budgeted to receive $25.5 million in 1980. Professional education-programs de- signed to improve the knowledge, skills, and techniques of the medical and allied health professions in the detection and treatment of cancer-was budgeted to re- ceive $15.9 million in 1980. Patient ser- vices-to provide for information, counseling, nursing and homemaking ser- vices, transportation, dressings, and loan- closet items-were allotted $19.7 million in 1980. Lastly, community services-to provide for programs in cancer detection, mass screening, rehabilitation, and devel- opment of cancer registries-were to re- ceive $12.5 million. Later we will look a bit more closely at some of these programs. Those who give their money to ACS are not getting a dollar's worth of cancer pro- grams for each dollar contributed. 'In 1980, for example, while ACS was able to raise $155 million from the public, fund- raising expenses, or what ACS had to spend to soficit that amount, were $21.5 mil(ion, or 14 percent of revenue. Further- more. ACS is an expensive operation to run, and 1980 expenses exceeded $16 million. In other words, 23 percent of con- tributions goes toward paying ACS's over- head. Although the society was born in 1913. as the American Society for Cancer Con- 74 PENTHOUSE trol (ASCC), its modern history begins at the end of the Second World War. It was at that point that the advertising genius Al- bert Lasker, along with his wife, Mary, and Elmer Bobst, one of America's most suc- cessful drug-campany executives, arrived at the society. Lasker and Bobst contend- ed that the society was being run haphaz- ardly and that what was needed was sound business practices for it to be a sig- nificant cancer-fighting organization. For example, in 1944 only $600,000 was raised. Bobst took a businessman's view of the society. His impressions are record- ed in his autobiography: "I decided that the first priority was to move aside the scientists and physicians who were in administrative control of the organization. They were good men, but they were not experienced leaders, and they were not getting results. I wanted ma- jority control to be in the hands of qualified lay leaders.... Second, we needed a great deal more money than we were get- Can the American Can Cancer Society remain objective about giving money to the very institutions whose representatives are involved in its decisions? / ting. I wanted to establish an immediate goal of boosting receipts tenfold in the coming year.... To accomplish these pri- orities, the society's constitution and by- laws had to be rewritten; and in order to effect a sweeping revolution, there had to be a showdown." The scientists and physicians who were in control of ACS were no match for the likes of such self-made millionaires and businessmen as Bobst and Lasker. Lasker had risen to the top of Lord & Thomas, one of the country's largest ad- vertising firms, while Bobst had climbed the ladder at Hoffmann-La Roche Drugs from salesman to.president of the Ameri- can arm of the company. Although ACS's professional leadership resisted and warned society voting members about the dangers of lay leaders with no scientific or.• medical expertise running a cancer orga- nization, Bobst and Lasker supporters ar- gued more convincingly. At a showdown voting meeting, after all the votes were counted. Bobst and the Laskers were in control of ACS's administration. After their victory, the heads of scien- tists and physicians in top society admin- istrative positions began to roll. These - men were replaced by leaders front4a military, banking, pharmaceulical, adv tising, oil, and chemical professions (in1 ests that continue to dominate the A' ' With their help, and with the use o professional fund-raising organiza6 Bobst's second priority of increasing r enues tenfold was nearly accomplishec a single year, as income rose from previous year's $600,000 to the 1945 1 ure of $5 million. For the next decade. ACS grew wealth, cancer programs, and natio political importance. With greater n enues obtained through the most sophi. cated fund-raising techniques, ACS w able to support cancer programs in manner undreamed of in 1945. In the ar of cancer research, for example, frc 1945 to 1955 ACS awarded a total of $, million to cancer researchers in this cou try and abroad. Indeed, by mid-centu the American Cancer Society seemed be held in greater esteem by Congre: than the government's own National.Ca cer Institute was. Dr. Michael Shimkin, a former top N, official, wrote about this period in ACS history: "The ACS also became the publ lobby for cancer before Congress. Tt function was honed to perfection by Mr [Maryj Lasker and her small profession advisory coterie...." Shimkin went on describe how ACS would take advantac of its political connections in Congress increase appropriations for the NCI. F though Shimkin wrote that "the balanc between NCI and ACS tended to kee both 'honest,'" others, who will be di; cussed below, disagree with that asses; ment, complaining that ACS has lobbie on behalf of NCI only to be in a position t control and direct the policies and spenc ing of the national cancer agency. It would appear that the first ten years c, the Lasker-Bobst leadership at ACS wer a great success. However, their contrc was still less than absolute. The millions c dollars available at ACS for cancer re search projects were controlled not b, them but rather by the Committee oi Growth of the National Research Council Its membership was made up of scientist from the National Academy of Science: and led by Dr. C. C. Little, who had bee ousted from ACS leadership by Laske and Bobst in 1945. This council decidec where the millions for cancer researd would go. The scientists who served as adviser; were retained by a series of one-year cort tracts. In 1955, for the first time in twenn years, the contract of the academy mem bers was not renewed. ACS explaineq "The invaluable advisory service of thi Committee, including some of the coun try's foremost scientists, had become re stricted through changes in the Sociery•'; program since 1945...." The Bobst Lasker coup was now complete. The old guard ACS scientists were out, and in thei, place was the elaborate Scientific Advisa ry Council, which included six (now ten; CANiiNVED ON P>GE 10,

,4 . I i The second question that is raised by ACS's closed system . of awarding re- search is whether it is making the best use FnoM P~cE za cor,TiN,EO of its contributors' money. Many cancer committees for the review of grant appli- cations. Its 1955 grant budget was $7 mil- lion. By 1981 this budget had grown to more than $52 million. Research is only one of the functions of the new ACS. It is also in the forefront of " public education, professional education, and patient and community services. In all these areas ACS's performance has been problematic. It is time to raise some ques- tions about how the American Cancer So- ciety uses the $150 million a yearr given by a trusting and generous public. The reorganization of the society in 1955-56 ensured control of cancer re- search funds by ACS's directors, who would appoint the membership for the new Scientific Advisory Council, rather than by committees from the Academy of Science. For more than twenty-five years the committees of the Scientific Advisory Council have been dominated by repre- sentatives from a small number of Ameri- can hospitals and universities. Further- more, while they constitute only 10 percent of all institutions applying for ACS research grants, they receive more than 40 percent of the money given out. These institutions include the University of Cali- fornia, Sloan-Kettering Institute, Yale Uni- versity. Harvard University, Albert Einstein Medical School, the University of Wiscon- sin. Stanford University, Roswell Park Me- morial Hospital, Johns Hopkins Univer- sity, the University of Texas, New York c University, the Massachusetts Institute of . Technology, Columbia University, the Uni- versity versity of Chicago, Rockefeller University, and Washington University in St. Louis. This situation raises two serious questions about cancer research 'in the United States. First, there would seem to be a question of conflict of interest. Can the ACS Scien- tific Research Council remain objective about giving money to the very institutions whose representatives are involved in its. decisions? The question is more pressing when we realize that although the ACS ap- proves more than 90 percent of research grant applications sent to the society (93 percent in 1980), limited monies allow for less than 40 percent of approved applica- tions to be actually funded (37 percent in' 1980). In 1981, $21.1 million, or 43 per- cent of research funds, went to the above sixteen institutions. Penthouse has been unsuccessful in getting the ACS to comment on this ques- tion of potential conflict of interest other than to quote its policy that "members of the Scientific Advisory Committees are disqualified from discussing and voting on, grant proposals from institutions with which they are affiliated." However, while members might scrupulously adhere to such a rule, even the appearance of such a conflict of interest should make ACS re- think its procedures. 104 PENTHOUSE experts have criticized ACS for pouring dollars into areas of research that have reached dead ends, while critical areas of investigation, especially those involving prevention, receive token support. A 1977 Washington Post article that was subsequently included in the Con- gressional Record attacked the ACS and the NCI for ignoring the overwhelming evi- dence that environmental factors cause the majority of all cancers. The authors, Daniel Greenberg and Judith Randal, charged that the society ignored or actual- ly defended potential carcinogens, among them.DES and saccharin. It is interesting to note that at the time that Coca-Cola (the company with the most to lose should Congress enact a saccharin ban) was lob- bying against government regulatory ac- tion, ACS was accepting its money to pay The ACS pours millions of dollars into dead-end research, while critical areas of investigation, especially those involving prevention, receive token support. ! for a society trip to the Soviet Union. In several discussions with Sheldon Samuels of the AFL-CIO and a member of the National Cancer Advisory Board, we were told of ACS's cool responses to funding research projects investigating cancer-causing substances in the work- place. In fact, Mr. Samuels told Pent- house: "Outside of support for the Environmental Science Laboratory at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, which has concentrated on asbestos as a polen- tial carcinogen, the society's interest in the critical area of environmental cancer re- search has been disappointing. In the case of the workplace it has even been perverse. The society is interested in can- cer in the workplace not out of concern for the workers but rather because of their usefulness as guinea pigs for cancer re- search." ' r Another expert in cancer prevention, Dr. Samuel Epstein, has criticized the role of ACS in ignoring the dangers of environ- mentally caused cancers. In his book The Politics of Cancer, Epstein wrote that "apart from being uninvolved in cancer prevention, other than to a limited extent tobacco, senior [ACS] officials have de- veloped for the society a reputation of be ing indifferent, if not actively hostife, t, regulatory heeds for the prevention of ex posure to carcinogenic chemicals in th, general environment and workplace." The American Cancer Society's clos. ties with big business may be a factor in it failings in the area of cancer preventior ACS's position is often similar to indus try's when the issue is regulatory or legis lative action against potential carcinogens In addition to its record on saccharin, Ep stein has pointed out ACS's opposition tc FDA proposals for inserting cancer warn ings in packages of the substitute estro gen drug Premarin; its opposition tc regulation of such potential carcinogen: as Red Dye # 2, TRIS, and DES; its rgfusa to support such legislation as the Clear Water Act and the Clean Air Act; and its generally negative attitude toward clean- ing up the environment and thereby help- ing to prevent certain cancers. All of these negative activities by the society should not be surprising, given its hostility to giv- ing money to cancer researchers con- cerned with prevention. Rather than supporting cancer-preven- tion research, ACS has always suggested that somehow the cancer victim is tc blame for his or her condition. For more than twenty years ACS has published "Cancer's Seven Warning Signals" bu1 hardly a word about avoiding chemicals in our environment that can cause cancer (cigarette smoking being the notable ex- ception). In fact, in the 1979 Annual Re- port of the American Cancer Society. which featured a special report on cancer prevention, the society discounted can- cer-causing properties in hair dyes and air pollution, ignoring the FDA's conclusions about coal-tar hair dyes. The "special re- port" on cancer prevention, a summary of the conclusions of a much-touted twenty- year study of one million Americans, failed to warn readers of a single substance in our food, clothing, or atmosphere that may cause cancer-with the exception of cigaretles. Another important area of cancer re- search that has received only meager support from ACS involves a hormone called chorionic gonadotropin (CG). As with smallpox and polio, it has been the dream of cancer researchers to develop a vaccine for preventing cancer. A little more than a decade ago, several re; searchers began to find high levels of cho- rionic gonadotropin in the serum of cancer patients. Since then, CG or CG-like mate- rial has been found in the great majority of malignant human tissues. If it can be dem- dnstrated that the CG is produced by all cancer cells, then cancer may very well be one disease, with different manifestations, depending' on where it appears in the body. At the very least this would mean that a vaccine for the prevention of cancer is theoretically possible. Whether or not CG fulfills the hopes and expectations of its researchers remains to be seen. Recent scientific literature is re- COroTINUED ON PA(',E t2.

:1 , , . CONTiNUEO FROM PAGE 104 .~ ' . . .~ < passed by Congress in 1980 to provide $25 million.annually for cancer research, to be carried out under the auspices of the National Institutes of Health and the De- partment of Agriculture. ACS's public-education program- "programs designed to inform the public about cancer, prevention and symptoms and to encourage periodic physical ex- aminations"-is more controversial than its research funding. In 1973 ACS ap- proached NCI with a novel idea for the de- tection of breast cancer in women. The project, known as the Breast Cancer De- tection Demonstration Program (BCDDP), encouraged women to undergo testing for breast cancer. With breast cancer striking one in thirteen women, ACS did not have a difficult time convincing American women to heed its advice, and more than 250,000 of them underwent mammography tests. Unfortunately, the BCDDP's mass radi- ation program actually has the potential to cause breast cancer in epidemic propor- 124 , PENTHOUSE plete with studies and articles demonstrat= ing the worthiness and appropriateness of this new avenue of cancer research, but neither the Nationat Cancer Institute nor the American Cancer Society has provid- ed significant funding for CG research. In a 1981 book published by Pinnacle Books, The Cancer Conspiracy, authors Robert E. Netterberg and Robert T. Taylor describe the frustrating and futile strug- gles of CG researchers: "Throughout this book, we have been writing about research by excellent, high- ly-recognized scientists, a very few of whom have been funded by either the NCI or ACS.... It has taken place practically in spite of the cancer establishment, with its emphasis on cancer centers and pri- vate industries.... Scientists like Drs. Hernan Acevedo and Malcolm Slifkin, who have made important contributions to the study of tumors and cancer-associat- ed bacteria, have been dependent upon small grants from individuals or founda- tions." Dr. Acevedo, a pioneer in CG research, told Penthouse that while he has received one American Cancer Society grant in the amount of $25,000 for CG research, re- quests for additional funds since the grant's expiration have been rejected by the ACS. He feels that the reviewers of his application at ACS do not have "a willing- ness to understand the strategies and im- portance of CG research." An ACS reviewer did conclude in 1980: "Although there are aspects of this work that seem somewhat foreign to our way of thinking about malignancy; the authors are quali- fied, and I would suggest an approach such as this be strongly considered." But Acevedo's grant application was rejected. Because neither ACS nor NCI has been responsive to' the promising area of CG cancer research, it was included in a bill age. (The effects of radiation will not be known for ten years, the period of latency for the disease.) It has been estimated that. 135,000 women under fifty years of age were included in the BCDDP.,- ACS and NCI had no real evidence that there would be any benefit from the mass screening of women under the age of fifty. On the contrary, there was evidence that the tests could be very dangerous. As ear- ly as October .1974, NCI official Dr. Na- thaniel Berlin told the President's Cancer Panel that NCI did not have any data to support ACS's urging of mammographies .on an annual basis, but ACS ignored him. Its intense "public education" cam- paign also ignored warnings from other establishment cancer experts.* For exam- ple, Dr. John C. Bailar, former head of NCI's Cancer Control Division, warned in 1975 that for every breast cancer detect- ed and cured, another would be induced by BCDDP. But ACS replied: The American Cancer Society has always suggested that somehow the cancer victim is to blame for his or her condition. MIN "One of the most significant discoveries made over the past year was that mam- mography is nearly as effective for detect- ing cancer in women 35 to 50 years of age as in those over 50. In response to some publicly expressed fears that mammogra- phy might pose radiation risks, ACS and NCI medical officials announced that they are convinced 'the benefits from the screening techniques far outweigh any possible risk involved." In 1976 the American Cancer Society's New York City division released a flyer en- titled, in bold letters, Urgent Message, with the subheading Mammography: Benefits Versus Risks. When the flyer was seen by Dr. Bailar, at the time editor of NCI Cancer Journal, he was horrified and immediately prepared a memorandum-which would be buried in NCI files. A few phrases from Bailar's memorandum are enough to indi- cate how reckless ACS had become in educating the public and physicians. The memorandum was addressed to the act- ing director of the National Cancer Insti- tute, Dr. Guy Newell: "I have just become aware of a problem that has the seeds of a major disaster.... The 'Urgent Message' itself is plain hog- to the embarrassment and cbappoiAt ment of earlier error..., the statement tc . seriously faulty, and hence presents' z grave danger to that block of women whc should avoid mammography." ° At the House hearings on the Nationa Cancer Program in June 1977, it was re• vealed that the ACS flyer had been sent tc every hospital in New York and to some 15,000 physicians. In 1977 NCI official- dom had come to accept the wisdom of its scientists arguing against unrestricted mammography tests, and, exasperated by the ACS determination to continue them, the NCI unilaterally tightened the guidelines for participation. Acting Direc- tor Guy Newell was asked if he thought it was "advisable or appropriate for ACS to circulate a flyer in that manner" and re- plied: "I suppose, Mr. Chairman, if we did not think it was appropriate to print it, I guess I would have to say that we did not think it was appropriate to send it." But by this time 135,000 women had placed their lives in danger. It may be a coincidence, but during the following year (1978) ACS was no longer receiving government money. Lane W. Adams, executive vice-president of the American Cancer Society, explained the end of the ACS-NCI partnership this way: "In November, the ACS took an action which will profoundly affect our future ef- forts to control cancer. By voting to de- cline federal aid, we issued a carefl,l, considered declaration of our indepen- dence. The amount of money involved was not very large; but a central principle was at issue. "As a voluntary agency, we bring dis- tinctive strengths to the struggle against cancer. We cannot afford to have that identity blurred or compromised. We must be able to speak without equivocation and act without hesitation. We must avoid the impression that what we do is in any way secondary, supplementary, or subordi- nate." And, although both parties deny that BCDDP had anything to do with the split, the same 1978 ACS Annual Report that contained the statement of Mr. Adams also continued its "public education" urg- ing women to subject themselves to mam- mographies. In the fiscal year ending August 31, 1980, ACS reported that it raised over $150 million. But as Greenberg and Ran- dal had reported a few years earlier in the Washington Post, "The power of ACS doesn't come from its money...." In- stead, "ACS's power comes from its abfli- ty to influence the spending strategy of the politically passive NCI.:.. ACS accom- plishes this through an intricate network of influential people who have been enlisted in the crusade." This "intricate network" of influence has operated since the mid-forties. It has included such powerful businessmen as J. Leonard Reinsch, chairman of the board of Cox Cable Communications:

Travis T. Wallace, founder of the Great American Reserve Insurance Company; 4 and Emerson Foote; cofounder of the Foote, Cone, and Belding advertising ~ agency. Every year ACS courts its good friends in the media by holding "science j writers' seminars,'' hosting and feeding ' the party line to friendly writers from all ', over the country. . As we've noted earlier, pharmaceutical- .. company executives have been heavily involved in running ACS and in that capac- ity have promoted at the NCI and in Con- gress the interests of their companies-in the area of cancer chemotherapy drugs. For several years ACS officials lobbied in Congress to have control of chemothera- py drugs transferred from the Food and Drug Administration to the National Can- cer Institute. Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, director of the Public Citizen Health Research Group, told Congress in 1977 that in many situa- tions NCI actually had endangered the public health with less-than-rigid controls in the testing and treating of cancer pa- tients with extremely toxic chemotherapy drugs, and he warned: "The American Cancer Society, in Washington at least, has demanded new legislation to remove from FDA the authority to regulate this cat- egory of drugs." In Washington former ACS lobbyist Na- thaniel Polster received a total of $221,917 from 1979 to 1981 to fund his work. Polster, who, after our second tele- phone call to his office, slammed down the receiver on us, gave us very little informa- tion as to what the American Cancer Soci- ety was buying for this money. Nor would the American Cancer Society tell us. Perhaps the greatest demonstration of ACS's political clout was the passage of the 1971 Cancer Act, the most significant piece of legislation passed in this coun- try's war against cancer, which enabled the National Cancer Institute to waste tens of millions of tax dollars. • . On December 9, 1969, the "Citizens Committee for the Conquest of Cancer," led by ACS officials Mary Lasker and Dr. - '' Sidney Farber and others, paid for a full- page advertisement in the New York Times entitled "Mr. Nixon, You Can Cure Cancer." It claimed that a cancer cure was at hand and that all that was lacking : was the dollars needed for victory over the enemy. The advertisement implied thaf ~ . , ~ I cancer could be defeated by 1976. Dr. Samuel Epstein has written that this lobby "effectively misled the Congress into be- lieving that the cure for cancer was immi- nent, needing only a massively funded national effort." While Mary Lasker had powerful friends in Congress, such as Edward Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey, ACS's Elmer Bobst had an influential ally-his old friend Aicharri Nixnn Rnhst wrnte in 1q73• "Re- cause he knew of my experience and knowledge, President Nixon called on me to consult with him before he decided to commit his administration to a national i 126 pENTHousE program for the conquest of cancer. .., f urged the president to support a proposal that would make the [National] Cancer In- stitute autonomous, -thus. stripping away the bureaucratic layers on top of it, give it an annual appropriation without any defi- nite limitations." But the 1971 Cancer Act did not go as far as Bobst and Nixon would have de- sired in making NCI "autonomous," be- cause many congressmen felt that the cancer agency, like all other health agen- cies of the government, should be an- swerable to Congress. As Greenberg and Randal wrote; "With all this social and business power at its command, the ACS has usually been able to overwhelm the civil servants of the NCI." And Rep. David Obey (Dem.-Wis.), an NCI critic, believed that "ACS wants to keep the Cancer Insti- tute strong in bankroll and weak in staff so that it can direct its spending without too much interference." And in 1977, at the House Overview of The ACS's breast-cancer detection program actually has the potential to cause breast cancer in epidemic proportions among women under fifty years of age. ?!j the National Cancer Program, Rep. Henry Waxman (Dem.-Calif.) asked Dr. Donald Fredrickson, director of the National Insti- tutes of Health, the parent body of NCI, "Would you recommend that officials in the National Cancer Institute not be direc- tors of the American Cancer Society?" Fredrickson replied, "I have that under study now, but my preliminary impression is that they should not." In April 1981, Fredrickson was firm in his impression and told Penthouse, "I think that because there is a potential for apparent conflict of Interest, it would be undesirable for NCI of- ficials to also serve as directors of ACS." The relationship between the American Cancer Society and the mass media has also been cause for concern. The annual Science Writers' Seminar, which began in 1959, was supposed to give science writ- ers the opportunity to meet members of the scientific community in an informal set- ting. But former ACS science editor Pat- rick McGrady, Sr., charged that instead the meetings became a"mediurn of self- serving propaganda" for the society. In 1979 author Robert Houston wrote: "Held at holiday resorts to lure and pacify report- ers, it can usually be counted on to gener- ate a barrage of breathless copy about how a mote in a scientist's lens spells im- minent victory against the dread disease. Softened up by the exalted false hopes (most of which later turn out to be cul-de- sacs or, worse, bottomless pits), the pub- lic is an easy prey for the Society's volunteer army." The media's coverage of ACS activities is too often less than critical or insightful. For example, in 1979 the Associated Press distributed a cancer series, Taming the Killer Cell, written by science writer Al- ton Blakeslee. It appeared in 230 newspa- pers with an estimated total circulation of • 13 million readers. Mr. Blakestee, who had worked for the Associated Press, was in the employ of ACS; yet the articles nev- er identified him as a member of the soci- ety. Moreover, the ACS, not the AP; paid Blakeslee for the articles. Dan Perkes, news features editor of Associated Press, told Penthouse that the point of the series was to inform the public about the latest advances in cancer research; however, in retrospect, he would not accept such ma- terial from ACS. Blakeslee told us that the American Cancer Society requested that the Associated Press note the author's af- filiation, but AP failed to do so. It should be noted that Mr. Perkes believes that Asso- ciated Press removed all "puff" or ACS propaganda from Blakestee's series be- fore printing the articles. However, there is little doubt that the 13 million who read the series were unaware that the cancer se- ries was an ACS publicity piece and not an objective series on the disease. Another influential reporter, Jane E. Brody, chief medical reporter for the pre_'t- trgi~s New York Times, actually collabo- rated with a top ACS official, Dr. Arthur I. Holleb, on a book, You Can Fight Cancer and Win, which among other things advo- cated annual mammographies. Although they stressed that the book does "not rep- resent official statements of either the New York Times or the American Cancer Soci- ety," it reads like a long ACS pamphlet. In her effusive introduction, Brody credits the ACS with the "promise of continuing- even accelerating-progress" in the war against cancer. The book is riddled with uncritical references to the ACS and, in an appendix, lists all the chartered divisions of the ACS in the United States and Can- ada. Ms. Brody, whose articles on health appear with great frequency in the pages of the Times and other newspapers, may not be an ACS official, but it is often hard to tell the difference. Perhaps, whether wittingly or unv.•itting- ly, the media also served ACS's purposes when they promoted the "magic bullet" ~ cancer cure, interferon. In 1977 ACS be- gan a program that would "provide need- ed funds quickly for top priority projects" in cancer research. The following year in this program ACS announced a major breakthrough in interferon research-"a natural body substance produced when cells are invaded by viruses"-and com- mitted S2 million of society funds for the {

i . Nui %A Iaac LA u ic auuaI ai wC, it wd~i Ule larg- '• est single commitment of.funds ever made byACS. The recipient of ACS's generosity was M. D. Anderson. Hospital at the Uni- versity of Texas at" Houston. Coincidental- " ly, former ACS president Lee Clark was in charge of the hospital in Texas. What was to follow ACS's commitment to interferon cancer research was a media blitz about the new maqic bullet to cure ` cancer. Optimism reigned as television news shows and popular magazines fea- tured stories on this latest cancer break- through, with much of their content supplied by ACS. All of it was encourag- ing, but little of it was based on any scien- tific finds about the efficacy of treating cancer with interferon. Ralph Moss, au- thor of The Cancer Syndrome, told Pent- house: "Interferon is not a fraud, but the announcement of the program was suspi- ciously timed. The ACS got the maximum mileage out of it. There was a crisis in fund-raising, they were having a PR cri- sis. ... It was at the height of the Laetrile controversy, and they were looking stuffy.... Interferon was the Laetrile of the establishment." - And the ACS itself seemed to admit fail- ure when Irving Rimer, vice-president for public relations, told us: "It is not neces- sary for the ACS to continue the funding of interferon acquisition. It'll take much more, time to determine the effectiveness of in- terferon. What looked at first like a more immediate promise for the role of interfer- on has become more complex, long- term." - ACS's control over cancer policy and practices in the country is further extend-d ed by its heavy lobbying in state legisla- tures. In Sacramento, Calif., for example, Charles Olson is paid $25,000 a year by the society to urge state legislators to con- tinue the ban on Laetrile. Mr. Olson told us that he could noi discuss his activities with Penthouse until he cleared it with ACS. He then became unavailable for comment;. our repeated requests for him to return our telephone calls, left with his service, went unanswered. However, the office of Sen- William Campbell, minority leader in the California Senate, was less reticent. Jerry Haleva, Campbell's executive assistant, told. us that he finds.ACS's activities offensive sonsidering the fact that ACS has prevent-d ed even hopeless cancer patients from using Laetrile. -_ "Our greatest concern is that the efforts of the American Cancer Society to defeat our Laetrile legislation have been funded by contributions of thousands of Ameri- cans who believe they are donating to im- prove cancer research to help find a cancer cure," he told- us. "The American Cancer Society has allocated $25,000 of their funds to retain a lobbyist in Sacra- mento just for the purpose of defeating the 'Laetrile freedom of choice issue.' That is really onerous to us in the light of the fact that our bill, as restrictive as it is, only pro- vides an alternative therapy to terminally ill cancer pauents-tnose patients tor whom orthodox therapies have given up all hope. And to have the American-Cancer Society.squandering hard-earned dollars of contributors on this kind of legislative effort is completely obnoxious to our of- fice." Haleva emphasized that Laetrile was not the issue in the legislation but rather that "the issue is one of freedom of choice: of how government says to dying cancer victims in California that we can't cure you, but we won't allow you to.experi- ment with a therapy in which you have faith." Jerry Haleva's remarks concerning Laetrile's being an issue "of one of free- dom of choice" for dying cancer patients raise questions about another major effort of the society, namely, its "Unproven Methods of Cancer Management" list. The society's pamphlet on the subject states: "Unproven methods of cancer management are as much a part of the (a An expert charged that the ACS "is interested in cancer in the workplace not out of concern for workers but rather because of their usefulness as guinea pigs." J cancer problem as is the capacity of the disease to kill." The "unproven methods" pamphlet is intended to warn both patients and physi- cians about quackery in cancer treatment and includes a list of those methods can- cer patients should steer clear of. Also, there are checklists for determining whether such medical specialists are "quacks," discussion of the psychology of cancer patients who frequent such medical specialists, and a brief essay on the conspiracy of propaganda by cancer quacks to impress and interest cancer pa- -tients seeking help. This "service" is one of ACS's major ef- forts. It involves publishing articles in im- portant medical journals, a national information service, lobbying activities to pass restrictive legislation, and participa- tion with government agencies-for ex- ample, the FDA and the U.S. Postal Service-in preventing circulation of infor- mation and material associated with quack cancer cures. Many of the cancer cures included on the society's "unproven methods" list seem to be obvious frauds. Few can argue with the service that the ACS is performing 128- PENTHOUSE r • - - .;, . . -- in warning the public about thet 4angars for the cancer patient. On the 6ther hak, there are substances and lreatmertts-or ACS's unproven-methods list that may, be more legitimate. " For example, just before Penthouse had published its article on Dr. Joseph Gold (January 1980) and the results that he had obtained with hydrazine sulfate, the American Cancer Society acknowledged that it had erred in placing the substance on its unproven-methods list since 1976. Hydrazine sulfate was taken off the list in November 1979, when the ACS was aware that the Penthouse story was about to hit the newsstands. As Gold had told Penthouse, he had labored unsuccessful- ly for more than three years in trying to get the society to reconsider its earlier deci- sion, but the ACS ignored the scientific data presented by Gold and other re- searchers that demonstrated hydrazine sulfate's positive results with cancer pa- tients. While ACS has no direct legal powers to prevent any physician from practicing an unorthodox cancer treatment, its awe- some power of lobbying and public-rela- tions machinery are very effective in discrediting alternative treatments. Many cancer patients believe that a particular mode of treatment has been outlawed by the government simply by its inclusion on the list, although many of the treatments are not prohibited by law. The ACS obvi- ously fails to recognize any freedom of choice for cancer victims. One reason for the medical establish- ment's great responsiveness to the Ameri- can Cancer Society is the considerable amount of money the society spends on "professional education." ACS spent $16.3 million for this program in 1980. Ac- cording to ACS, "The professional educa- tion program of the Society provides factual information and the means for edu- cation to physicians, dentists, nurses and to members of the allied health profes- sions, to persuade and stimulate them to carry out new or special procedures in the detection, diagnosis, and treatment of cancer and to recognize the importance of their individual roles in determining the ex- tent to which cancer is controlled." But the National Cancer Institute al- ready spends millions of dollars for pro- fessional training (in 1980 the amount was $42.9 million). Private contributors to the American Cancer Society may well ask themselves if it should be their burden to educate one of America's highest-income groups. In generat,. the American Cancer Soci- ety has ignored or refused to comment on ihe critical issues raised in this article. While it is all too eager to have the media spread its version of cancer truths, it ap- pears that the society is unwilling to re- spond to any criticism of its vital and central role in determining cancer policies in the United States. Perhaps it is time for the millions of ACS contributors to force such a public accounting. OH•-a