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Brown & Williamson

Smoking and Health Proposal

Date: 1969
Length: 9 pages
690010951-690010959
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Fields

Type
SPCH, SPEECH/PRESENTATION
MEETING MATERIALS
Characteristic
MARG, MARGINALIAMN Selected
Named Person
Blalock, J.V./X
Foote, E./X
Muije, C./X
X/Us Fcc
X/Us Congress
Yeaman, A./X
M, C./X
Attachment
332506
Litigation
10004026
10004045 05583
10003108 00933
10004026 04295
10004026 04660
10004042 11536
10004042 00069
10004013 00069
10004027 00015
Request
E26
E28
Original File
Original Assignment and Proposal
Date Loaded
23 Nov 1998
Brand
Belair
Kool
Raleigh
Viceroy

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Page 1: 0000332506
• I SNLOKING AND HEALTH PROPOSAL What we want to do this morning is to take a summary look at the L---~/~------smoking and health question and then make a proposal to you for a B&W project to counter the anti-cigarette farces. ~- -JThis is a chronological table of smoking and health activitics, "Not all the activities by any means• We have been selectivc in making up this • chart -- just picked those events that caused headlines to be made and probably left strong impressions with the public• As we look at it I believe we can see how we became an harassed and restricted industry ~/~ and how we came to conflict with the awesome forces of the federal government. It is also a sort of key to the characteristics and processes involved in the smoking and health question• Looking at the individual elements we see... (eonlment). To summarize the anti-cigarette activities I think we can say that: First - They have managed to bring us from a simple . conflict of attitudes to a state of condemnation and severe restriction. Second - Their efforts have been aggressive while ours have been defcnsive. Third - The anti activities are rather orderl~ -- almost as if they had a plan working for them. &l
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! Fourth - Their activities are accelerating and becoming znore damaging io us all the time .... Over the past three weeks I have been reading vast amom]ts of material from Mr. yeaman's and John Blaloekfs files and it has given me a picture of what the anti-cigarette forces are like and what the pro- cigarette forces are like. I think the antl-clgarette forcas can be ¢har$cterlzed as dedicated opportun~ists. They are quick to act and seem to be totally unprincipled in the type of information th6y use to • attac~the industry. The pro force~, on the other hand, and ltm speaking primarily of the Tobacco Institute, seem to be slow to act,)mainly defenstve~ and rather narrow in the area of defense~. The Tobacco Institute has probably done a good job for us in the area of politics and as an industry we also seem to have done very well in turning out scientific information to counter the anti-smoklng claims. There is no question, though, that we have ~.been inept i0 getting our side of the story.:]good though it raay be, _.across to the news media and to the public• I an% convinced that the nature of the institute, the way it is organized and the way it operates, snakes it practically impossible for the Tobacco Institute to speak effectively to the ~ews merlin. It has uo personality mad is not f~rnous, ~ It just can't compete with the anti-cigarette forces who can make their ]~ pronouncements through Emerson Foote or the.Surgeon General. Those men have news value just on the basis of their names.
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- 3 - This whole problem of getting our story across to the raass public provokes tW1s q~estion: "Should B~/ t~ke sorae independent ~nd unilateral action to counter the anti cigarette forces? ,r Arld ~'Carl we afford it?" What is the justification for taking unilateral aciinn? Here is a chart that I think justifies such a program. It ~Kys we are losing our commercial freedom. We are restricted in terms of ability to sell -- in colleges and in vending machines. Our products are branded with a warning label. Our ability to advertise has been attacked on all t~'onts and has consistently deteriorated. First there were restrictions on health advertising imposed by the Cigarette Advertising Code and the N. A. 1~. Code. [Yhese codes also included restrictions regarding television time and prograln selection. We have been classified as a public menace by the F. C.C. and are obliged to suffer public eondemt~atlon along with litter bugs and forest fires. In %he near f~It~Ire ~ve "¢~ill %~thdraw frOnl the brosdcas% medi%inl and already pressures are growing to limit our advertising activities in print. Addition- ally, nearly every state in the Union is ready to pounce on us with restrictive legislation as soon as Congress opens the door on this possibility. In thinking over what we might do to improve the case for cigarettes, I have looked at the problern somewhat like the marketing of a new brand. Here is a chart wb,ere I have defined the basic marketing elements which ~'I I see in the smoking and health problera. Our consumer I have defined
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] - 4 - --as the mass public, our product as doubt, our message as truth -- well stated, and our compgtition as the body of anti-cigarette fact that exists in the public mind. We have chosen the mass public as our consumer for several reasons: - This is where the misinformation about smoking and health has been focused. - The Congress and federal agencies are already being dealt with -- and perhaps as effectively as possible -- by the Tobacco Institute. - It is a ~woup with little exposure to the positive side of smoking and health. - It is the prime force in influencing Congress and federal agencies -- without public support little effort would be given to a crusade against cigarettes• ~" Doubt is'our product since it is the best means of competing with the "body of fact" that exists in the mind of the.general public• It is also the means of establishing a controversy, Within the business we recognize that a controversy exists. However, with the general public the consensus is that cigarettes 8re in some way harmful to the health. If we are 5~eessf~l in establishing ~ controversy ~t the public level, then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking and health. Doubt is also the lin~it of our "product". Unfor£unalely, C
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- 5 - we cannot take a position directly opposing the anti-cigarette forces and say that cigarettes are a contributor to good health. No information that we have supports such a claim. Truth is our message because of its power to withstand a conflict and sustain a controversy. If in our pro-cigarette efforts we stick to well documented fact, we c~n dominate a controversy and operate wi~ the confidence of justifiable self-interest.~ Now, how can we get started on an independent program of action? Here is one idea. I% is tentntive ~nd ske%chy but it is ~ Starting place. I donlt even have a time element in this but that comes later when a thorough study of this subject is made and a detailed plan developed around this idea ... (comment on pl~n). We have seen research this morning which indicates that there is at least a potential for using put owll ads to eommunlcste the other side of the clgarette story. Before putting this type effort into practice, however, we ~vould want to bc absolutely certain that there is no damage to our advertising or to the consumer ~eceptance of our brands. So the first step for the ~mmediate future would he research. We are recommending basic research to unearth specific problems in smohing and health that we can deal directly with. Corny Muije will describe the type of research we think is needed . , , l (Corny Muijeh 0 &1
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L JAThat was shown today specifically demonstrates what happend when a certain type of information was supplied with the KOOL Adios IIad. indications are that the KOOL copy effectiveness was enhanced• We need more evidence that this is true. Furthernlore~ we need fo establish whether this solely hinges'on the Adios II ad and the specific body copy --used. Also, is this an effective approach when the information is supplied with ads for VICEROY, RALEIGII, and BELAIR? For these reasons we are proposing what I will call Phase I of this research program . . . (Chart I and comment). Since we, at this time, do not know which RALEIGH and BELAIR adver- tising copy will be in future use -- KOOL and VICEROY testing should precede RALEIGH and BELAIR testing. The testing cost of Phase I should not exceed $60, 000. It would be substantislly less if results o~ KOOL and VICEROY were unfavorable and we therefore cancelled the RALEIGH and BELAIR portion. Success in Phase I should lead to Phase II . . . (Chart II and comment). It is essential that we ascertain w}ich type of.anti-cigarette information has most affected the smoking public. What claimed health hazard's are currently accepted by the general public. A gener~1 survey ~vith detailed questioning should establish %his. 0~
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/ - 7 - During Phase II we should also investigate consumer reaction to at leas{ three distinct anti-cigarette approsehes. In addition, consumer re~ctiot~s to maybe ~. dozen specific anti-cigarette claims could be probed. The purpose of Phase II is to establish v~hieh pzsi information rand %vhich current anti-cigarette claims are most damaging, prom this we should learn which information should be of greatest interest to the public. We could then tailor ou~ efforts more precisely to achieve the greatest effect. Without specific detail the cost of Phase II cannot be estimated accurately. But, assuming a general survey of 1,000 respondcnts, copy research on three commercials and copy claim research on twelve claims, the costs ~" for Phase II should not excced $40, 000. Successful completion of Phases I and II leads us to Phase III -- test me.rket or test m~rkcts . . . (Chart lll and comment). None of the research, up to %his ?oint, ~vill have le% us know the effect of sustained repeated exposure of B&W cigarette ads with body copy of different content. prior to a nation-wide eoln*nitment, one or more test markets would be called for. At this point it is impossible to say whether one or morc test markets would be desirable. ~J
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Regardless, in each instance we recommend that a consumer survey be ,conducted prior to the start of the test market and anotheT o~e at the end of the test market. A comparison of the pre and post surveys will enable us to evaluate the effect of the total campaign, We would like to have the Executive Committeers approva/ to initiate the research program that Corny has jusl explained and at the same time to start a task force study of the Smoking and health quest/on and develop a detailed plan of action for B&W. Such a plan would cover: - Sources of information about sxaoking and health. - The selectlon and clearance of information to be used by B&W. - The developnleni of new information about smoking and health. - Means of anticipating and countering the release of misinfornxation. - Channels other than our own advertising for getting messages to the public. - Ways to use and perhaps focus industry efforts in support of our own program. CD CD
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- 9 - ' - Agency participation in the program. - Internal administration and implementation of the program. - Thorough evaluation of potential advantages and dis- advantages of public action on B&W and its brands.

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