Brown & Williamson
Smoking and Health Proposal
Fields
- Type
- SPCH, SPEECH/PRESENTATION
- MEETING MATERIALS
- Named Person
- Blalock, J./X
- Foote, E./X
- Muije, C./X
- X/Us Fcc
- X/Us Congress
- Yeaman, A./X
- Attachment
- 332501
- Original File
- Original Assignment and Proposal
- Request
- E26
- E28
- Litigation
- 10004026
- Date Loaded
- 23 Nov 1998
- Brand
- Belair
- Kool
- Raleigh
- Viceroy
Document Images
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SMOKING AND IIEALTH PROPOSAL
What we want to do this morning is to take a summary look at the
smoking and health question and then make a proposal to you for a B&W
project to counter the anti-cigarette forces.
This is a chronological table of smoking and health activities. Not all
the activities by any means. We have been selective in making up this
chart -- just picked those events that caused headlines to be made and
probably left strong impressions with the public: As we look at it I
believe we can see how we became an harassed and restricted industry
and how we came to conflict with the awesome forces of the federal
government.
It is a/so a sort of key to the characteristics and processes involved in
the sriloklng and health question. Looking at the individual elements we
see ... (comment).
To summarize the anti cigarette activities f think we can say that:
First They have managed to bring us from a simple
conflict of attitudes to a state of condemnation and
severe restriction.
Second ~ Their efforts have been aggressive while ours
have been defensive.
Third - The anti activities are rather orderly - almost
as if they had a plan working for them•
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Fourth - Their activities are accelerating and becoming
more damaging to us all the time.
Over the past three weeks I have been reading vast amounts of material
from Mr. Yeaman's and John Blaloek's files and it has given me a
picture of what the anti-cigarette forces are like and what the pro-
cigarette forces are like. I think the anti-clgarette forces can be
characterized as dedicated opportunists. They are quick to act and
seem to be totally unprincipled in the type of information they use to
attack the industry.
The pro forces, on the other hand, and I'm speaking primarily of the
Tobacco Institute, seem to bc slow to act, mainly defensive, and rather
narrow in the area of defense. The Tobacco Institute has probably done
a good job for us in the area of politics and as an industry we also seem
to have done very well in turning out scientific information to counter
the anti-smoking claims. There is no question, though, that we have
been inept in getting our side of the story, good though it may be,
across to the news media and to the public• I arn convinced that the
nature of the institute, the way it is organized and the way it operates,
makes it practically impossible for the Tobacco Institute to speak
effe~%iv~ly ~o the news medi~. It h~s ~ p~rson~[ity ~a~d is not farno~/s•
It just can't compete with the anti-clgarett~ forces who can make their
pronouncements through Emerson Foote or the Surgeon C, ene~al. Those
men have news value just on the basis of their names.
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This whole problen% of gettinG our story ~cross to the mass public
pro~,okes %hi~ question: "Should B&W take some i~ld~pendent and
unilateral action to counter the anti-cigai'ette furces 7 r~ And "Can we
afford it?"
What is the justifleatlon for taking unilateral action? }lere is a chart
that I think justifies such a program. It ~ays we are losing our commercial
freedom, We are restriated in terms of ability to sell -- in colleges and
in vending machines. Our products are branded with a warning label.
Our ability to advertise has been attacked on all fronts mad has consistently
deteriorated. First there were restrictions on health ~dvertisinG inlposed
by the Cigarette AdvertisinG Code and the N.A,13. Code. These codes
also included restrictions regavdinG television time and program selection.
We h~ve been clasalfied as a public menace by the F. C. C. and are obliged
to suffer pubit~ conderanati~n ~long ~th litter bugs ~nd forest fires. [n
the near future wc will withdraw from the broadcast medium and already
pressures are growing to limit our advertising activities in print. Addition-
ally, nearly every state in the Un~on is re~dy to pounce on us with restrictive
legislation as soon as Congress opens the door on this possibility.
In thinkinG OVer what we might do to improve the case for cigarettes, t
have looked at the problem someu, hat like the jnarketing of a new brand.
Here is a chart where I have defined the basic marketing eleraents which
I see in the smoking and health problem. Our consumer I have defined
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as the mass public, our product as doubt, our message as truth --
welt stated, and our competition as the body of anti-cigarette fact that
exists in the public mind.
We have chosen the mass public as our consumer for several reasons:
- This is where the misinformation about smoking
und health has been focused.
Y
The Congress and federal agencies are already
being dealt with -- amd perhaps as effectively as
possible -- by the Tobacco Institute.
It is a group with little exposure to the positive
side of smoking and health.
It is the prime f~rc~ in influencing Congress and
federal agencies without public support little
effort would be given to a c~,usade against cigarettes.
Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the
"body of fact" that ~xists in the mind of the general public. It is also
the means of est~hlishlng ~ eontl-oversy. V¢ithin the business we
recognize that a controversy exists. However, with the general public
the consensus is th~% cigarettes are in sou~ W~y h~rmful to the health.
If we are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level,
then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking
and health. Doubt is also the limit of our "product". Unfortunately,

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we cannot take a position directly opposing the anti-cigarette forces
and say that cigarettes are a contributor to good health. No information
that we have supports such a claim.
Truth is our message because of its power to withstand a conflict and
sustain a controversy. If in our pro-cigarette efforts we stick to
well documented fact, we can dominate a controversy and operate with
the confidence of justifiable self-interest
Now, how can we get started on an independent program of action? Here
is one idea. I% is tentative and sketchy but it is a starting place. I don't
even have a time element in this but that comes later ~vhen a thorough
study of this subject is made and a detailed plan developed around this
idea . . . (comment on plan).
We have seen research this nlorning which indicates that there is at
least a potential for using our own ads to communicate the other side of
the cigarette story. Before putting this type effort into practice, however,
we would want to be absolutely certain that there is no deun~ge to our
advertising or to the consumer acceptance of our brands. So the first
step for the immediate future would be research. We are recommending
basic research to unearth specific problems in smoking and health that
we can deal directly with.
Corny l~Iuije will describe the type of research we think is needed . ..
(Corny Muije).
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What was shown today specifically demonstrates what happend when a
certain type of information was supplied with the KOOL Adios II ad.
Indications are that the KOOL copy effectiveness was enhanced• We need
more evidence that this is true. Furthermore, we need to establish
whether this solely hinges on the Adios II ad and the specific body copy
used.
Also, is this an effective approach when the information is supplied with
ads for VICEROY, RALEIGH, and BELAIR?
For these reasons we are proposing what I will call Phase I of this
research program . . , (Chart I and comment).
Since we, at this time, do not know which RALEIGH and BELAIR adver-
tising copy will be in future use -- KOOL and VICEROY testing should
precede RALEIGH and BELAIR testing.
The testing cost of Phase I should not exceed $60,000. It would be
substantially less if results on KOOL and VICEROY were unfavorable
and we therefore cancelled the RALEIGH and BELAIR portion.
Success in Phase I should lead to Phase II . . . (Chart II and comment}.
It is essential tilat we ascertain which type of anti-cigarette information
has most affected the smoking public. What claimed heMth hazards are
currently accepted by the general public.
A general survey with detailed questioning should establish this.

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During Phase 21 we should also invent~gate consumer reaction to at
least three distinct mnti-eigarettc approaches. In addition, consumer
reactions to maybe a dozen specific anti-cigarette claims could be probed.
The purpose of Phase II is to establish which past information and which
current anti-cigarette claims are most damaging. From this we should
learn which information should be of greatest interest to the pub2ic. We
could then tailor our efforts more precisely to achieve the greatest effect.
Without specific detail the cost of Phase 2I cannot be estimated accurately.
But, assuming a general survey of 1,000 respondents, copy research on
three commercials and copy claim research on twelve claims, the costs
for Phase II should not exceed $40, 000.
Successful completion of Phases I and 22 leads us to Phase III-- test
market or test markets ... (Chart III and comment).
None of the research, up to this point, ~ili have let us kl~oN the effect
of sustained repeated exposure of /3&W cigarette ads with body copy
of different content.
Prior to a natlon-wide tornmitment, one or more test markets would
be called for.
At this point it is impossible to say whether one or more test markets
would be desirable.

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Regardless, in each instance we recommend that a consumer survey be
conducted prior to the start of the test market and another one at the ead
of the test market.
A comparison of the pre and post surveys will enable us to evaluate
the effect of the total campaign.
We would like to have the Executive Committee's approval to initiate the
research program that Corny has just explained and at the same time
to start a task force study of the smoking and health question and
develop a detailed plan of action for B&W.
Such a plan would cover:
Sources of ioformalion about smoking and health.
The selection and clearance of information to be
used by B&W.
The development of new information about smoking
and health.
Means of anticipating and countering the release
of misinformation.
Channels other than our own advertising for get±ing
messages to the public.
- Ways to use and perhaps focus industry efforts in
support of our own program.
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