Tobacco Documents Online

DRAFT keeping nearly $400 million in sales. Suddenly, that "mere" 10 percent of brand switchers become a very important audience. ~ Medel State Program Under S.I088 a "Model State Program" would be established with several goals and specific criteria to encourage states to prevent tobacco use by minors. Mr. Chairman, no one should suggest that state and local governments need federal encouragement in this area. State and local jurisdictions are on record as having local tobacco taxes, local advertising Aa~s, sampling bans, sales and smoking restrictions. Moreover, the "Model State Program" as defined in S.I088 mirrors what the tobacco industry itself is already doing. I've given you a~ overview of our youth initiatives; I'd like to walk you through a side-by-side comparison of the tobacco industry [Visual Aid: youth initiatives and the "Model State Program." side-by-side comparison. ] The "Model State Program" is designed to prevent initial use of tobacco products by minors. Our program helps p~ven~ youth access to tobacco products. The "Model State Program" would encourage cessation of tobacco use by youth and others, including "high risk" categories. Our program is designed to discourage young ii CONFIDENTIAL: .............. OTA TOBACCO Lm6AT ON .... TIMN 366171

DRAFT people from smoking. The "Model State Program" would implement and enforce a prohibition on the sale of tobacco products to minors. Our program Implements and encourages a prohibition on the sale of tobacco products to minors. In the proposed "Model State Program," to qualify for a federal grant, a state must: o have in effect a law prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to those under 18. The industry supports such laws, and supported the successful passage of them in six states just this year. o improve enforcement of this law. The industry's "It's the Law" program does this. o have in effect a law intended to reduce youth access to cigarette vending machines by minors. The industry supports state legislation requiring supervision of cigarette vending machines in places frequented by youth. o improve enforcement of this law. s the Law," coupled with industry support for the use of tokens, lock- boxes, etc., works to achieve this end. o have in effect or seek to establish a law prohibiting the distribution of free samples of tobacco products. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, the industry voluntarily has banned sampling on public streets, 12 CONFIDENTIAL: MINNESOTA TOBACCO LITIGATION TIMN 366172

DRAFT sidewalks and parks, and does not give samples to people under 21. F~ther, the indust~ progr~ offers "Tobacco: Helping You~ Say No," to deal with peer press~e, which Und~ this p~ovision of S.i088, compliance wi~ laws to prevent youth access to cigarettes would shift from law enforc~ent agencies to p~lic health authorities. Today, 47 states and ~e District of Col~bia have laws~' ~e sale of tobacco products to minors. Those laws can and should be enforced -- by law enforcement officers whose duty it i~ to uphold ~e law. Moreover, it should not be the role of ~e federal gove~ent to usu~ the powers and prerogatives of state and local government~. The $25 million allocat~ for 1992, with the promise of additional fun~ for 1993 and 1994, throws money at an issue already e~eri~cing nationwide att~tion. In addition, it would duplicate ~e effo~s of ~e ve~ indust~ it is t~ing thwart ~~ge co=itted to o= pro~am to reduce ~e supply,_ _nd .~ tobacco products by minors. Some may ~estion our motive, but it's really ve~ simple: the tobacco indus~y does not want, nor has it ever wanted, ~derage youth to smoke. We have vol~tarily end~ free distribution of product s~ples in p~lic. We have vol~t~ily stopped cigarette bill~d 13 CONFIDENTIAL: MINNESOTA TOBACCO LITIGATION 366173 " -

DRAFT advertising near schools and playgrounds. We are firmly behind raising the minimum age to 18 and requiring supervision of vending machines. We are giving parents the educational tools they need to talk to their kids about smoking and are working with professionals to develop more. We are working with retailers to make it tougher for minors to buy tobacco products. And we are conducting a multi-year advertising campaign to broadcast our program and our message. Mr. Chairman, I find myself in the unusual position of saying to you that the tobacco industry is already working to achieve the goals of Senator Kennedy's bill. Anti-Smoking Advertising Campaigns S.1088 would establish two new federal bureaucracies within the Department of Health and Human Services. One of these would administer anti-tobacco "information" and "education" programs, including the Model State incentive program I've already discussed as being unnecessary,~--~h~-i~-~. Mr. Chairman, the industry supports the goal of this legislation to reduce the number of young people who smoke, and I agree that realistic, responsible action should be taken to prevent them from smoking. This bill has a price tag of $110 million for 1992 alone. That's a lot of money to spend when there are already huge amounts of anti-tobacco information and negative media coverage out there. Public awareness levels regarding smoking almost 14 CONFIDENTIAL: MINNESOTA TOBACCO LITIGATION TIMN 366174 "

DRAFT reach the point of saturation now.11 Frankly, we can't expect a new counter-advertising campaign to increase what are already very high levels of awareness. We do need to make sure our children are as well-informed as they can be. The same anti-tobacco advertising campaign that's been going on since the first Surgeon General's report has reached kids and adults alike. Ever since that report was first issued over 25 years ago, federal health officials and other policymakers have actively warned the public about health risks allegedly associated with smoking. State and local governments, as well as anti-smoking organizations and individual activists, have joined this crusade against tobacco use by dedicating their efforts toward reducing the n1~mber of people who smoke. The anti-tobacco lobby also has turned its attention to youth smoking in recent years, developing outreach programs and educational camgL~igns designed to teach children about the health ef-~ee~s~associated with smoking. And students are getting the message in the classroom. A 1988 National School Boards Association survey of public school districts found that 75 percent have anti-smoking programs at the elementary level, 81 percent at the middle school level and 78 11 Five years ago, an HHS survey showed that not only had the American public heard that smoking posed a health threat, but 95 percent be~i..eved that cigarette smoking increased the risk of lung cancer. Messages about other health hazards linked to smoking also were received -- 92 percent believed it increased the risk of emphysema and 91 percent believed it increased the risk of heart disease. Most Americans also b~lieve that second- hand smoke is harmful to nonsmokers. 15 CONFIDENTIAL: TIMN 366175 MINNESOTA TOBACCO LITIGATION

percent at the high school level. The pttblic information campaigns that would be conducted under this bill are directed to '~., school dropouts, pregnant women, minorities, blue collar workers and low income individuals." It seems to me the assumption here is that cigarette advertising improperly "targets" these groups. Mr. Chairman, I find this attitude paternalistic and condescending. The underlying implication is that these groups are in need of special protection because they can't determine their own best interests. It is not the function of government to play "Big The CaliZornia ~xperience The State of California began a $28.6 million mass-media anti-smoking campaign in April of 1990, as part of a 1988 cigarette-tax initiative According to state officials, the ad campaign has reduced smoking in that state. Statistics show that the percentage of adults in California who smoke went from 26.3 percent in 1987 to 21.2 percent in 1990. Reports attribute the 5.1 percent drop in smoking directly to the anti-smoking educational initiative. Based on this, other states are now seeking to emulate the California example, in an effort to reduce smoking in their states. But let us examine the real reason smoking rates declined in California. The ad campaign was part of a larger initiative, which included a 25-cent increase in the state's cigarette tax (from 10 16 CONFIDENTIAL: TObaCCO TININ 366176

DRAFT to 35 cents per pack). That increase took effect in 1989, prior to the ad campaign. By examining cigarette sales statistics for the period of 1987-1990I2, a completely different pictm:e emerges. Between 1987 and 1988, there was a one percent drop in purchases; from 1988 to 1989 a 13 percent drop; and from 1989 to 1990 sales remained virtually static, rising by six-tenths of one percent. SO in ~e year prior to the tax ~ncrease, sales fell by one .~;~,;<7~erc~t, then ~opp~ ~a~tically by 13 percent after the t~ ?~ncrease took effect, an~ beZore the ad ca~aign was latched. • ~learly, the decline in smoking cannot be attribut~ solely to ~.~e ad c~pai~, as ~e decline cached before ~e ads were It ~s unfort~ate ~at the statistics have been so skew~ ~ere. ~is is an attempt tu claim success by falsely attributing a costly anti-tobacco advertising c~paign and hiding ~e real cause of the decline in smoking. It is misleading to ~uggest that o~er states would experience similar declines in smoking if they were to adopt an anti-smoking adve~ising c~paign, got only is it misleading, but it is a dissa~ice. I would strongly reco~d ~at ~e California adve~ising example be e~osed for what it is: a costly priam that did not alter smoking habits. 12 Based on the Monthly State Cigarette Tax Report for calendar years. 17 CONFIDENTIAL: MINNESOTA TOBACCO LITIGATION TIMN 366177

DRAFT Zn~ed~ent and ~dd~t~ve D~scZosu~e I mentioned earlier that two new bureaucracies would be created under the provisions of S.I088. The first would, in the words of Senator Kennedy, "get the anti-smoking message to the nation.''13 That is, to a nation that already knows the message. ¢~ The other new agency would administer a program regulating ..~.~"additives" -- even though the safety of additives is currently the responsibility of the Secretary of HHS under existing law and there has been no suggestion of health concerns based on the ~additive information supplied to the Secretary by the cigarette manufacturers over the past several years. The Center for Tobacco Products would be directed to inform the public regarding constituents of, and additives to, tobacco products, and to restrict the use of additives that represent a Significant health risk to the public. The Center would be directed to investigate the additives contained in tobacco products and to determine whether such additives represent a significant added health risk to consumers of such products. If the Center determines that any tobacco additive, either by itself or in conjunction with any other additive, presents unnecessary increased risks to health, the Center would be authorized to prohibit the use of a tobacco additive or allow its use only at reduced levels. Further, the Center would be directed to require public 13 Kennedy press release, details tk 18 CONFIDENTIAL: MINNESOTA TOBACCO LITIGATION ~ 366178

DRAFT disclosure, through labels or package inserts, of tobacco product additives and "harmful tobacco smoke constituents " Cigarette manufacturers would be required to provide to the Center a complete list of each tobacco additive used in the manufacture of each tobacco product brand name and the ~antity of such additive, and a complete last of all brands ~at includes the levels of "tar," nicotine, carbon monoxide, and other constituent (as dete~ined by the Center) for each brand as dete~ined by ~e ~nufa~er. ~. ~ai~an, many of these provisions sustantially duplicate existing law. To the e~ent these provisions would =hange existing law, the change would sere no d~onstrable policy objective. ~ese provisions also .would threaten public dis=fosse of c~ercially sensitive info~tion that cu~ently is protected from public disclosure as .trade se~et or confidential info~ation. Su~ disclos~e would produce no public benefit. Under ~e Compr~ensive Smoking Education Act, enacted in 1984,. the cigarette manufact~s ~e re~ired to provide the Secret~ of ~S on an a~ual basis "a list of the ingredients added to tobacco in ~e manufa~e of cigarettes." 15 U.S.C. section 13~Sa(a). ~e list provided to the Secre~ need not identify the company involved or the brand o~ cig~ettes that con~ins ~e in~edients. (Ibid.) Congress considered the disclos~e o~ cigarette in~edient info~ation on this basis to be ade~ate to "pe~it ~e fed~al gove~ent to initiate ~e 19 CONFIDENTIAL: MINNESOTA TOBACCO LITIGATION TIMN 366179

DRAFT toxicologic research necessary to measure any health risk posed by the addition of additives and other ingredients to cigarettes during the manufacturing process." H.R. Rep. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984). The Secretary, in turn, is directed to transmit to Congress periodic reports advising Congress of any information pertaining to such ingredients "which in the judgement [sic] Secretary poses a health risk to cigarette smokers." lid. Section 1335a(b)(i).] Each year since 1986, the six major cigarette manufacturers have jointly submitted ingredient lists to the Secretary as required by the 1984 legislation. The most recent list was submitted just this past December (check on this) In 1988, then-Surgeon General Koop indicated that the Department of HHS was actively reviewing the ingredient lists that had been submitted. There is no reason to believe that this existing review mechanism is inadequate and .needs to be expanded or replaced. Neither is there any justification for requiring public disclosure of tobacco additives. Because information concerning the ingredients used to manufacture particular cigarette brands is competitively sensitive, Congress provided in the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act that the ingredient information supplied to the Secretary "shall be treated as trade secret or confidential information." Such information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and criminal penalties are established for unauthorized disclosure. [15 U.S.C. Section 1335a(b)(A).] The Act specifically requires the 20 CONFIDENTIAL: '~ MINNESOTA TOBACCO Lrn6AT ON TIMN 366180 .....