Tobacco Documents Online

9/.01 ~900G

---

---

%Vha~ ll.'~ppens If 'rhi~ .Strntr.Ry. Succeeds ? I~ ~s Is allowed to stand unrcfutcd, then It Is only • n~a~er o{ time bcfor~ smoking Is restricted cw~rywhcrc, including the home~ and ~lH~at~l~ efforts ~11 be mad. ~ re~ric~ ~h~ ~uf~=~. ~r~r.~ potation and ~ales ~t t~bacco product~. For~ately~ the aIlega~on that smoking cau~c~ diseaee~i~ not true, and there Is no mescal e~dence in support of ~uch a theory, Unfortunately, the fact remains: that already 71% of non-smokers and 51~ of smokers believe this falsehood.. !."'; These percentages may be expected :o increase, since, it is strategy of the antl-srnoking forces to design propaganda ~vhich will reinforce these bclicfs, without actually stating that smokers cause disease in non-smokers. Ambiguous terms llke "noxious" and "po]lu|ion~" are certainly cf/ective Ln accon%p]$shing this. | How Can This Strategy Be Effect~vcl.Z Countered? }~o counter-strategy can succeed unless ~'e are aisle to refute the falsehood about non-smokers being s~bject to disease. 0 0

l{ere is a list of possible positions and Itrat¢~ie8 that have been considered. ~nconelus~vc. Eliminated because: Both smokers and non-smokers already hold convictions to tie contrary, and see the warning label as the tobacco manufacturer's ag'reement. Research indicates 56~ ot s~okers and 83~0 of non-smokers say" most s~okcrs v}~ll get a serious l]b~e~s. ~ any event~ there Is no prospect of reversing the public point of ~ew in time to prevent ~dcsprcad antl-smoking ]egivlation, • 2. The to%acco h~d~.~;trv is e~se~t~al to t1~c economy,. tax rcvenue~ etc. Rejected because: ~esearc~ clearly s~ows that t~o public is prepared to ~acrlficc economy if health Is at s~kc. Tobacco ~sfi~tc ~urvey among high ~ncome a~d rural popula~on of tobacco s~tcs ~ows 47~o bc]ievc smoking should bc banned in all public places, both before and afte~ ads ~trc~slng economic importance industry, ~ ,. O

3. History_~_nd=h!;r~t,~c of the. tobacco inc|~stryo Rejected because.: It is not relevant to the issue of restrictions • • l. S~nokln~ ~n n)~leration . Re~ected because: It addresses lib, elf to the health of the ~oker but not necessarily to the health of the non-smoker, ~ t~e case of liquor~ t~.ere is no ~de~prea~ ~ndard for • . ~odera~on or e~coss In e~o~ng. Hero, legal problems ar~ luvo~ed ~u any atten~p~ to suggest ~,~at • ~er~tc" con sumption. l~cJe~ted because: The l~u~,llc doe~ not concede the right to i ~, • mztnuf~tcturc something which ~n their opinion c~uses a serious ~ ~ ~ • ; ~ ~s~se among non-~sers. [

6. ~jorlty o£ poIL~,~a_tio!~.,~atisfled ~vith c~rrent co~ditio~s on smo~-.inR/non-svnok|nR and no further Rovern~ent rev, u_lat{~_n_ _i~ r equlr...o, d, Y~cjectcd: 68~0 o( non-smokers b~lievo that the g~)vernment should further restrict smoking ~nd only [/3 of smokers ~II be bothered if there are more rest~ic~ons, expect ~orc laws to be passed and 38~ of smokers believe they . be p~ssed to protect non-s~okor~ 7~ ~e tobacc9,1ndustrY has contriN~ted to and :. ~b]ect~e unbiased medical research, :: -. Rejected because: This does not address the ques~on : " addlHonal ~ws "agalnst ~mokers. ~ 8. ~e smoker Is a ~ood ~uy~ courteous, not messy, " "doesn't smoke ~herc he shouldn't. Re~ected~ Non-s~noker clearly,perceives that every smoker " ' i~ ~ot a good guy and that if his health is ~t s~ke, he cam~ot rely upon the smoker ~ot to smoke in his presence.

ImporL~nt but subsidiary~ There Is p~bllc acceptance that smokers h~ve rights but not to the extent that their smoking ~e~sIy a~ccts the hcalt~ of otl~cr~. ~us. it ~ust ~Ir~ be e~blished that smokin~ {s not ~rmful Lo non-smokers~ ~e~Ith. lO. Srnolcer courtes.~ • . L~portar~t but subsidiary~ I~ an i~dividu~l belle~e~ '.~ ]s at ~ke~-he ~II not depend upon the courtesy of smokers to ~reserve it. Courtesy iz a suitable explanagon , Is ~erely an annoya~ce to the non-smoker~ but It Is not s ~ui~ble ~ r~ponse if it Is believed that it causes disease In non-smoker~, Smoker/non-smoker .problem can be worked out on an |ndivldual basis without governn~en+. |nterference. Important but subsidiary~ The public clearly soe that if the smoker Is ~c~ally causing disease among non-smokers~ indi~dual arrangements will not cover all the contingencies. ~is posi~on Is only tenable xvhcn smo~.e ~s regarded as a mere annoyance.

• ~?a}Id becax~se: The evidence is that th.~ preponderance o[ doctors believe this, it can be egfecti;'e: ~.~ s~bstantlstlon 19 adequate. gy the p~ ~ces~ ~f ellm~na~o~,. ~l~ere ~p~ar~ to b~ only one c~ntrol ~'trategy wgich is ~kely to affect the outcome of the present anti- ' ShoOing pro~ganda. " "" .The mos~ ~erable aspect of t~s pro~ganda effort I~ that they are " ~sing ~h~ ~oft lie tec~que ~bout ~isesse among non-smokers, i '" .. ~ere Is~ as far ~s ~e ~o~v at this ~me~ not even a controversy ~n ~ the l~cue of non-~mokers contrac~.ng disease. H~ one ques~ons t]~at ~ • • other people's smoke can bc ~nnoying. Tl~erc is some mescal oplnien ~. t~at indi~duals ~ay l~ve transitory p~y~ic~l discomfort and some ~ ~ather va~e assumpNons on the part of some ~nedic~l a~thoritles that ~ people ~th cer~.in pre-exlsIing conditions could possibly be affected . by ambient smoke,

This ia a far stronger pot~ition than can be caLablishcd on the effects ef ~o~tlng upon ~oke~. The la~cr Is an unresolved controversy about ~s~cal inference, but the preponderance of the rncdlcal profession e~denGy ~t~'ibut~ c~g~alit~" to ~o~ng hy ~ the ca~e of non-~moker~, there I~ no controversy over ~U~tlcal inference, "" preponderance o~ ~he oplMon of ~edlcal .... ~e e~dcnce from our resea.rch Is that It would be Impotent to have as much ~rd e~dence as possible to demonstrate that medical au~orl~es ever~,whcrc and ~der all clrcumstande~ firmly believe ' " that no dlscasc can be tran£mltted to non-smokers. ~ - . At prese~, a m~terial ~ndlcap is the n~mber and avail~bilit7 of authorizes who can be speclflcally quoted ~thout compllcat~ng reser~ons. . ' " A subsidiary concern is the extent ~o wblch thcse authorizes can be quoted and idcn~ficd xdthout permission which may not, In all cases, be

A net, ingrcd~ent that h~.s entercd the equation sinc~ tho re~earch ~v completed is t~t Secretary Califano ha~ cry~l/zed the by calling upon th~ governors and iegislaU,res o~ the variou~ ~tate~ ~'hile we do not have research directly applying to thi~ Issue, there a con~Iderab~ ~ndlca~.on Iron~ other sources that ~ere Is ~de~pread public opposlt~on to passing ~necessary laws, ~rticularly ~ the case of antl-sn~o~g laws, ~owover, It Is clear that a ver~ sub- s~ntlal body of the public do~s believe that smo~g causes dissase In non-smokers. ~ey are lik¢l~ to support an~-smo~ng laws even ~hough : .. ~hey ~nay believ~ that the~ ara prac~cally unenforceable against In= all.duals. They ar~ box, fever, cl~arly enforceable "against corpora~ons~ and business places. The and't-smoking forces are truly a~.r~ of the " potential of hca~ ~nes agaln~;t res~uran~s~ factory o~ers, etc. ~e forhmate aspect of the Callfano s~tement is thaiIt crys~llzes the an~-s~o~ng si~atlon in terms ~f the threat of specific leglsla~.on against smoking on the grounds t~at leglsJa~on is required to prevent ph),slcal harm to the non-smoker.

---

~ ang-~o~ng Rroup ~n opportunl~ to de~troy our position by quo~tione from authorities ~ho choose to interpret health by a unique set of .. Instant ~ubstantiatlon must accompany the above message. ~ ' The to'coo ~n6ustry cloarly ~ulfers from a pre~ent credibility problem on the Issue of ~n~okcr'e health -'- reflected In ou~ quallta~ve research. ~ ": .'.""'. ~zo~.flon~ from single authorities can and ~II be percclved as berg ". chosen selec~vely by the tobacco Industry to the exclusion of other - '-. :~.:.. " autho~ties which hold opposite ~cw~. . ' . ~ • ~. ~Ve need~ for communications p~rpose~, concise ~nd bcllevable ..... ,. • s~b~nNation to accon~pany our ~essage. • ~ .~... ' At the ~oment this I* our %veakc~t llnk. ~ile ~e have a larg~ file of s~s~ntia~on~ many of the sl~tements are poorly phrased and j~ . ~ll of quali/icafions. The public may, have no way of asscssi~g the ~ vag~ of the ~ourccs, even in those cases ~here we can give clear , : "' attribution.

Wc must then consldcr whether we have. any a.lternative to our ~u~stantl~Hon base. ~e alternaHve is research conducted by pecc~bly ~ut},ori~v~ ~ources on the opl~ion~ of medical experts. The q~e~on that ~e need to hax'e medical experts answer must be 'ramedunequtvocally. Forexample: "Do,ouhave~n,e~dencethat non-smokers can contract any disease from other people smoMng in the ~amo area?" ~Can you cite any ~peclflc medical research that w~ld support the bclte~ t~t non-smokers contract disease /rein other people smo~g In the These are pcrfcc~y le~i~raate qucs~ons demanding a yes or no answer. At tMs point it seems highly u~likcly tha~ many medical authorities can ~nswcr then~ In t~c affirn~a~ve. The Issue to be faced here is whether there is ~me t; complete such research quickly cr~ough to be effectLve agalnst an~-smo~ng pro~ganda. An alternative Is to go ~.ith the material that we now have ~hlch ~ubject to son~e credibility problems and the possible neces~l~ of qualifying statements on pre-cxqs~ng afnictions.

We ~:an, of ~o~t's¢, move on both frotRs and phar, e into mo:'e concise sub~tant~lation wl~cn It bccome~ available. IIoxv do ,x,e comm~lnicate the central thou.qht that hundreds o~ are not needed hccau~ br~atl~i~o~Ber p~ple~s tobacco smoke doe~ no~ c~u~e diseaae~ There Is no need to go Into the ob~ous way~ ~n wMch thl~ me~age can be communicated to legisl~tb~s, tho~ght leader~ and othe~s that "' can be reached by mail or lace to ~ace. ' But the problem ta here that althoogh face to ~ace communica~on may .: ... .. ~low do~ the legtsla~ve process~ we can be s~mped by a voter ." ..' " '~ptnton over ~mc. It is cer~tnly no secret t~t legislators ~ghly responsivh to public: opinion polls though they may personally ..... have grave doubts about the valldi~ of public opinion. The anti- . smo~ng forces Mll ~nques~onablg generate p~blle opinion :. The da~ ~ve ~eo reflected in our o~ research could demonstrate "" to leglslato£s [hat it is political sutcido not to enact restrtc~ve

ironc]a~ ~efen~e of t~cir po~l~o~. ~t the present ~e t~o research clearly ~ndic~tcs that a ~ajori~ o~ s~okers behove that they ~re c~sin~ disease In others and are defenseless against s.¢h an ~llcgafi~. They mu~t be lurni~hed this information and [urnished It quic~y be~f~re its acceptance becomes hardened, The kef communications p.roblem we have is how to reach not thousa~s of leglslators alone, but millions oi voters who will be . '.." :~".. on pubic opinion records. "" ' ": ~e pr~lem we have here i~ that due to the an~-s~o~ng propagandists, ~.~ we ~ve compara~vely little access to mass media. SecretaryCalifano ' can In~ntly, and as the research shows, effect a comrnunlca~on to ~;e en~c country t~ro~gh the Wa~ldngton press corps, Experience -~ in~ca~s that a reply.on the part o£ th~ tobacco industry ~ll be buried. ~,. ~..'..~ .. . ; . It is ~sible to theorize about debates on television and favorable editorials '" "and o~r channels of co~unlcati.on~ but the bitter truth about these ~ is t~t they don't r~sch ~nough peep1?.

Gredibility is ~gh ~ut readership is low, .~t Is virtually :.~po.,..~ibl~. to create th~ reach and frequency in the communication reply through the editoria~ side o~ a mass commurHc~tlon system, when you are do~ending yov'rsclf against a m~ss government and activist at~ck, Wl~a•. abou~ advertising? Advertising has the opposite difficulty. It has relatively low credibility, b~t ha~ the capacity for very Mgh reach ~ and ~req~ency of ~ communicatlon. ~nfortun~tely, the most'e~fective ~ for~ of adver~sing in ~ co~muni~a~on on ~oliNcsl ~atters i~ closed .. to the tobacco Industry on this controversy. Telo~ion ~s Mg~ly effec~ve In controversies because~o ~ large extent, tele~slon can get across its potnt xvhether the ~ewer Is . ~o]~mtarily intereste~ In t~is subject or not. But the only available channel open to thetobacco Industry Is pri~t " " ~dvcrfislng where its message, if complicated or difficult, can e~lly bo Ignored. ., ~ere are additional problems to advertising. ~e Is tha~ the has held that corporate advertising for the purpose of influencing legi~la~on cannot be d~ducted as a business expense•

Anofl~cr ,factor that n~ay be Involved, eapccially ifqootat|on o~ au~hor~tlcs is Indicated, Ls th~ New York ~tc, for example~ ha~ ]~ws ~orbiddlng the use o~ name~ ef people in aJver~sln~ for trade or commercial p~rposes ~vit.hout t~eir consent. But by far the greatest problem with advertising in publications, ' So one ~>f credibility. This neans tha~ there is a very high need clear and unmistakable eugstanttatlon of s~atements made. ~dds to compllc~llo~s because It Is necessary to include them " tl~e adverH~ement itself ~l~Ich crestes the proble~ o~ ~. long and torbldding copy that resists readership. " ~e AnN-gmoMn~ Counterattack' ~ a propaganda situatlon~ we must consider that ~vh~tever com- m~icaHon the ~dustx'y decides to make~ .there Mll be the probability of strong counterattack. .H we employ advcrHs~ng to gel our message across~ we may a ~olent and ~perat~ve reaction from anti-smo~ng pro~gandi~t~. 0

It Is s, ltally i~H)ortant that v~e consider what the svor~t consequence o~ ~uch an attack m~ght be. It is possible that we can ~kc ~ ~trong point, yet b~ ~lnerxblo to a ~evere counterattack that ~ould nullity ~ny ~ins ~c ~iRht ~ake, Te s II xve decide to proceed on the above strategy, then we ~hould have .. hard evidence that the change in a.ttit~de ~ve are able to achieve ,~ warrants the expense and risks involved. • "'" ' It is our recommendation that the adve~tls~g messages that Judgmen~l cvalua~on be tested under ~ecure laboratory conditions .. "::... ~ " ' to determine the degree of at~due sht~t that may be expected. ~ly " , . • -.'.' aRer doing so can we properly a~scs~ ~vhether a test market operaHon t~ ~arranted, • .~.- :. : . " " ~e te~t market operation carries ~ith it the probability of a "" .... co~teratta~k being ;~rted well ahead of any na~onal or s~te.effort, ..... "" ~d thereNy blunting the content of our ~,e~sage. ~ the othor hand, "real world" exposure ~11 give us some da~ not easily observed in a laborator7 slh~a~on, We think the risks and re~rds of a test market can best b~ seen after a laboratory eXl)CX'~n~ont.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---