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NARRATIVE OF KEY EVENTS IN SOSAS PROJECT ..

I. NARRATIVE OF KEY EVENTS IN SOSAS PROJECT ~ackground " 1 B. Calender of Events. . . • 1 ACS Meetings " 2 2. RJR Strategy in Response To Anti-smoking Campaign ..... 2 3 New York "Retreat" on SOSAS 4 4. Formulation of SOSAS Strategy ......................... 8 5. Basic Issues Identified by Research ............ • ....... i0 6. Viable Communication Options .......................... ii. 7 i ki j - 1 • Pass ve Smo ng As Ma or Issue ........................ 2" 8. Problems with Passive Smoking Mass Communication ...... 14 • 9. Courtesy/Corporate Profit Reexamined .................. 20 10 Ad Tests " " 22 ii Tobacco Forum " 24 12. California Campaign ................................... 25

NARRATIVE OF KEY EVENTS IN TIIE SOSAS PROJECT I3ACKGROUND SOSAS (Study of the Sociai Aspects of Smoking) was the direct result of a change in the strategy of anti-smoking forces in the fall of 1976. Previous to this time, ~he main thrust of anti- smoking activity was to eliminate cigarette advertising from TV and to con~nunicate warnings through mandatory advertising legislation and the media that smoking was harmful to the smoker's health. In 1976, the .American Cancer Society proposed an were to promo'te legislation banning smoking in both public and private places, to focus propa- ganda on the presumed health hazards to non-smokers, and to eliminate all cigarette advertising and promotion. To implement this program, the ACS organized among its own membership a National Commission on Smoking and Public Poli&y. It held "hearings" in various cities throughout the United States in the spring of 1977. o

CALENDER OF EVENTS • March 1977 On March 22, the first meeting of the National Commission on Smoking and Public Policy was held in Los Angeles. The purpose was to gather testi- mony from objective (though ACS hand-picked) witnesses regarding the danger of smoking. Seven more regional hearings were conducted in May/June. The tobacco industry was immediately faced with the decision as to whether to participate in the "hearings". On March 25, RJR requested five of its advertising agencies to make a recommendation. The unanimous recommendation was not to participate but to undertake a long-range program to determine public attitudes toward smoking, particularlyin respect to the relations between smokers and non-smokers and their rights and concerns. April 1977 Utilizing its own advertising agency, public relations, and other consultants, the SOSAS group of RJR conducted intensive research among the public and thought leaders to determine their attitudes on the social aspects of smoking. At the same time extensive investigation was made into the claims of anti-smoking groups and eva].uations were made as to possible responses the o industry might make to these a~:'guments, o

June 1977 A research study conducted in June 1977 by V. L. Tarrance indicated that t~e Tobacco Industry image "' was not positive. The Industry was rated 5th of 5 and below both the Liquor and Oil Industries. Focus g~oups were conducted by the Beaumont Organization in June to identify smoking-related issues and their relative importance to the general population. Irri- tation to non-smokers and non-smoker health were qualified as the two most important issues. July 1977 Public Opinion Research was launched by the Beaumont Organization to identify major industry problems and possible positions of greatest appeal to general public. On July ii, Agency Management, Account and Creative Groups met with Jim Peterson and Hudnall Christopher in Winston--Salem to discuss overview of SOSAS project. August 1977 On August 16, BBDO Account and Creative Groups were briefed on anti-smoking issues by RJR Legal and R&D in Winston-Salem. . In August 1977 BBDO~prepared a stn~ary of the history .i of prohibition to underscore the similarity of events leading to p~ohibition compared with current anti- O O smoking activities. -3-

September 1977 BBDO continued work on the development and refinement of basic concepts representing viable long-term SOSAS directions. October 1977 In October of 1977, the SOSAS group held a "retreat" in New York City and reviewed all of the data then available. • From this meeting, several critical facts emerged: (i) The public, both smoker and non-smoker, had serious concerns about the health effects of smoking on non-smokers. (2) Non-smokers were in favor of greater restrictions On smoking areas and even smokers showed little resistance to this. (3) Conversations with thought leaders indicated little belief in the health hazards to non- smokers, but encouraged the thought of some efforts to promote courtesy as a solution to the smoker/non-smoker conflict. (4) While the public had a general disposition to resist government interference in private affairs, this did not appear to strongly influence the majority who found merit in restrictions on the areas in wh~ch cigarettes could be smo)[ed •

Perhaps the most significant outcome of this meeting was that the evidence clearly showed the lack of public interest and support for reopening the questions of primary smoking, the economic disadvantages to farmers, employees of the industry, and~other economic and social factors that "had been considered as possible valid arguments against further restrictions on smoking. Subsequent to the October SOSAS ':retreat", further information from focus interviews and from Yanhelovich research generally confirmed the previous data. November 1977 A meeting was held on November 22 at BBDO with Mr. Shinn commenting on several SOSAS position statements. Based on these co~nents various positions were eliminated from future consideration due to legal considerations. BBDO supplied several demographJ.cally acceptable test markets to Roy Pfautch and the Edelman organization. RJR personnel further restricted this market list on the basis of the local press, severity of local anti- smoking climate, etc. Two test areas (Erie, Pa. and Des Moines, :Iowa) and two matched control areas (York, Pa., and Omaha, Neb.) resulted from this process. BBDO reiterated its concerns with test marketing, stating that test markets would forfeit O O

the surpr£se element. Also, measuring attitude shift over'such a short time interval would probably result in inconslusive data. December 1977 In a December 5 meeting with Hudnall Christopher it was confirmed that BBDO's primary responsibility for all work would be the passive smoking issue. Also comments from Messrs. Crohn, Shinn, and Jacob would be incorporated into several alternative concepts prior to group sessions to be held later that month. On December 13, concepts were finalized with RJR MRD in New York City and the first focus groups testing advertising concepts were conducted in New Jersey. • " Advertising concept focus groups in.Seattle on December 19. Advertising concept focus groups in St. Louis on December 20. From the focus groups four positions emerged as being most viable for future consideration: Non-Smokers' Health, Courtesy, Smokers' Right to Smoke, Additional Government Regulations. The first of these potential .. positions, Non-Smokers' Health, was judged to have the greatest promise.

Also in Deebmber, results were received from the Yankelovich Corporate Priorities Research designed to measure public policy pressure on business. The research was conducted among leadership people (government, media, financial) as well as the general population. High proportions of both population segments view passive smoking as a health hazard and see increased cigarette tax as the next public policy target. In general, there was little confidence in business with most people feeling that there is an over-emphasis on profit at the expense of public interest. In December BBDO was charged with identifying various service programs (fire prevention was among those suggested) for public relations purposes. The agency forwarded its proposal and suggested some preliminary research to determine the potential downside of relating the tobacco industry (cigarette smoking) with fire prevention. The public service program was later dropped from consideration. January 1978 In January of 1978, anew element was the announcement • by Secretary Caiifano of an ambitious government anti- smoking prograra which received widespread publicity and co~nent, much of it focusing on the question of whether the Federal Government had a legitimate function in this area. t, O

As of January 1978, a ])road strategy had to be ].aid down based on the research and other data that had been accumulated. The principal problem was to determine what the response of the tobacco .industry should be to the new thrust of anti-tobacco propaganda and legis- lative initiative. The questions were to whom should this response be directed, the form the response should take, and what should be the source of the response. " It was generally agreed that the principal burden of response would of necessity be through the Tobacco Institute, although RJR had undertaken to develop such a response on its own initiative. The Tobacco Institute had already undertaken an advertising campaign in tobacco-growing states wh~.ch was apparently effective in reinforcing public .I attitudes toward the economic significance of the industry. It is doubtful, however, that the campaign addressed itself specifically to anti-legislation and propaganda.

Another activity purely outside the SOSAS scope was the California Referendum. IIere, unlike the rest of the United States, specific legislation was pending and clearly the most effective communication related to the specific defects of this legislation. Considerable thought had been given to some groups that might be responsive to and supportive of the industry position. RJR undertook a statewide campaign on "Pride in Tobacco" and developed plans for employee co~unications. The charge to SOSAS was, therefore, to develop a conm~unicatio~s strategy outside of these specific areas. Considerable investigation was undertaken to deter- mine whether there were other sub-groups in the population in which SOSAS might become involved because of an identity of interest. Although voluntary smokers' rights organizations existed, it appeared inadvisable to reduce their credibility through industry involvement. Cooperation with groups not economically involved with the industry gave little evidence of practi- cality at a national level.

Essentially, it appeared that the targets for a response by the industry would ~nvolve the public at large, °opinion leaders, and possibly the business colmmunity as potential specific targets. The most critical problem was the question of the nature of the response itself. The basic SOSAS publ~c opinion research had indicated six major issue areas contributing to the present anti-smoking effect: i) Passive Smoking Issue 2) Annoyance/Courtesy Issue 3) Social Cost Issue 4) Declining Images of Smo]{ing/Smoker Self-Image 5) Government Role in Smoking Issue 6) Credibility of Tobacco Industry Research had indicated that mass communication programs would have little impact in two of the six areas: ~ Social Cost; ~ Credibility of Tobacco Industry In the absen'be of a specific place of legislation as a target, an effective response appeared to in- volve only four viable options as follows:

i) Defense of smokers' rights as J.ndividuals and the preservation of their freedom of choice. 2) Communication of courtesy as a solution to the problem as an alternative to.mandatory legislation. 3) Co~nunication of the concept that the relation- ship between smokers and non-smokers is an individual matter which should not be subject to government interference. 4) Communicating the fact that tobacco smoke does not in fact adversely affect the health of non- smokers. The research indicated that all of these had some viability but virtually every other communication suggested over the entire investigation appeared to be contra-indicated by the research data. At one point, considerable consideration was given to a campaign urging "Moderation" in smoking, an approach that had been successfully employed by the alcoholic beverage industry.

Unfortunately, whatever may be the merit of such an approach, it is frought with legal difficulties as well as having doubtful application in the passive smoking issue. Based on the December focus groups, BBDO began writing ads to the four basic positioning statements. On Uanuary 24 a meeting was held in Winston-Salem with Jim Peterson, where the Agency presented 24 print ads (3 ads each of 8 campaign ideas written to 4 strategies). Max Crohn supplied detail Legal comments. Mr. Peterson invited the Agency to present the creativ~ to Messrs. Sticht and St'okes in early February. February 1978 In examining the four potentially viable arguments above, it became clear that it was important to understand what people meant when they expressed the belief that non-smokers' health could be affected by the activities of smokers. There appears to be little doubt that many people are annoyed by other people's smoke. And there is some evidence that there are those who actually i~ave physical discomfort in the presence of the smoke of others. O

If this were the limits of the problem, arguments about smokers' rights and campaigns for courtesy and solving the problem on a one-to-one basis could be expected to have considerable validity. After all, many things that people do are annoying to others but not every annoyance calls for restrictive legis- lation. The problem revealed by the research, however, is that both among non-smokers and smokers there is a prevalent belief that serious and fatal disease can be caused by other people's smoke. This is clea~ly the area in which the subtle propa- ganda of anti-cigarette forces have been enormously affective. Responsible authorities and.medical re- searchers have been careful not to state this specifically. What they have done is permit lay people in the anti-cigarette movement to hurl those charges without contradiction. The result being that 71% of non-smokers and 51% of smokers have come to believe that it is true. If it were true, Of course, it would be difficult to argue against restrictive legislation on smoking. The non-smoker's right to live would certainly supersede the smoker's right, to smoke. The non-smoker could reasonably refuse to negotiate on a personal basis a matter involving life or death. -]3-

Likewise, a smoker holding this belief, as 51% appear to do, finds himself in an indefensible position in asserting his rights or protesting restrictive legis- lation. On February 2, a meeting, of the SOSAS was conviened at BBDO. In attendance were Hudnall Christopher, C. A. Tucker, Griff Harlow and Richard Ryan from RJRT; Tom Dillon, Lew Pringer and Dave Robins from BBDO. It was the conclusion of this group that under prevailing conditions a "courtesy" response alone would be unsatisfactory, since it was necessary to clearly establish• first of all that the smoker was It was the concern of the SOSAS group that unless an informed public was able to reject the notion that smoke was harmful to non-smokers, that over the long range legislative restrictions on smoking in the presence of others would be unavoidable. And apart from formal legislation, extreme pressure might be brought to bear even affecting, smoking in a private household. Acting upon this, the SOSAS group endeavored to determine if it were possible to develop a clear-cut, credible, and fully s~bstantiated statement on the subject.

This turned out to be more difficult than it might appear. i) It is almost impossible to legally and logically state that ~ny substance whatever is harmless to man. This is true of. foods, food additives and every other environmental factor. The most that can be said with certainty about anything is that it has never been demonstrated to be harmful. This may appear to be hair-splitting, but it had enormous practical significance in connection with any future litigation that might arise. 2) While for practical purposes, smoke does not affect the health of non-smokers, some medical authorities believe that some small minorities of people with pre-existing physical problems might be adversely affected by ambient smoke. For example, it has been stated that anyone with emphysema can be a{ least temporarily affected by any foreign particles or gases in the air. For these reasons it was believed more prudent to c~mmunicate the following concept:. OTHER PEOPLE'S SMOKE }]AS NEVER BEEN SHOWN TO CAUSE D~SEASE IN NON-SMOKERS. The phrase "cause disease" was fe].t critical, o O

While it ma~ have been more attractive to say "affect the health", it was believed doubtful that we could get a consensus as to what constitutes health. Some doctors maintain that merely personal irritation is unhealthy. However, research indicated that the public felt that non-smokers could actually get such things as lung cancer and heart disease as a direct result of breathing other people's cigarette smoke. Therefore, it was agreed that "cause disease" would form the basis of the primary SOSAS communication. Another problem with the passive smoking issue was credibility. Qualitative research indicated that the tobacco industry suffered from lack of credibility regarding smokers' health. Therefore, it was agreed that instant substantiation, in the form of inde- pendent expert witness, must accompany the SOSAS message. At that time in February, the need for substantiation was the weakest link in the SOSAS project. Although a large file-of st~stantiation existed, many of the statements were poorly phrased and full of qualifi- cations. There was no way the public could assess the validity of our souQces. Therefore it was agreed that some study must be conducted by impaccably autnori~ati|_ sources ol~ the opinions of medical experts, rega~.-d~n9 passive smoking and disease. Until .... . .................... .................................

such a study could be conducted i£ was decided to use existing secondary source substantiation for the time being, and to phase into more concise substanti- ation when it became available. The need for clear and unmistahable substantiation was underscored especially since the plan called for advertising as the eventual vehicle to communicate the SOSAS proposition. The problem here was twofold, as follows: i) advertising's low inherent credibility and, 2) it was observed that credible substantiation' -" ~~'~ " " ly " copy that could resist readership, print being the only medium open to our message. Still an exhaustive copy development program com- menced involving the basic passive smoking pro- position with myriad executional approaches. Ads of varying sizes and shapes were developed with executions differing from cartoon characters to real people to celebrities to straight concept ads con- taining no visuals other than print. On February 2-3, W. McGuire, Yale Psychology .Professor, reviewed the i0 advertising campaigns in New York ~ith BBDO and RJR personnel. The discussions conf~.rmed -].7-

several major principles guiding "issue" advertising and suggestions were offered to increase the comJnuni- cation impact for certain 'campaigns. Further dis- cussions were planned to subjectively reduce the number of campaigns for subsequent testing. On February I0, Agency Mhnagement gave a presentation of SOSAS creative development to date to the RJR Public Relations Management. On February i0, a meeting was held with Messrs. Sticht and Stokes attending. A limited selection of SOSAS creative was presented (i ad each for 6 campaign ideas). Agency Management presented BBDO's position regarding issue versus several other viable positions.. The presentation was favorably received and general approval was given to refine the creative for eventual copy testing. On February 14 BBDO conducted, a hotline on the meaning of the word "disease". Conclusion: "Disease is what you can catch; what you do to yourself is not a disease." On February 22 a meeting was held at BBDO between RJR Legal (Max Crohn, Ed Jacobs, William Shinn) and Agency Legal and Management to discuss and refine copy from the February i0 meeting. Among other things it was o ~.greed that the basic "<!isease" c].aim must be qnalified o and that the Sul-geon Gene~'al "Warning" label would .~

be rcquire~in SOSAS ads. On February 23 BBDO updated Mr. R. Aurelio of Edelman Inc., regarding SOSAS creative. Agency Management presented its passive smoking position as well as legal comments from the February 22 meeting. Mr. Aurelio alho reiterated the Confirming Edelman position that all their research to date showed that non-smoker health was the root of the overall SOSAS issue. BBDO provided Mr. Aurelio with specific scientific quotes to aid in an Edelman white paper on the subject. -On February 27 Agency Management reported the Aurelio As a result of these meetings, subsequent conversations and correspondence, it was decided that BBDO .should concentrate all creative efforts on the passive smoking issue in anticipation of impending copy research. In February an Advertising Image Study was conducted by Peruzzi and Walzer, under the direction of BBDO, to gauge the perception of smokers as typified in cigarette advertising. It was found that in general, people do not identify smokers with the-positive .. attributes they relate to their friends. However, smokers as portrayed in advertising are more likely ~ 0 than "actual" smokers to be identified as friends, o

March _- 1978 On March 21 RJR requested BBDO to re-consider "Courtesy" as well as the "Corporate profit" approach and asked that work on these two areas be developed along with the basic passive smoking creative. At a March 28 meeting in New York" City, Hudnall Christopher presented rationale for re-examining the "courtesy" position. BBDO presented creative in the passive smoking, courtesy, and corporate profit areas. It was agreed to hold a work session on April 5 to review how courtesy could be integrated with the basic passive smoking advertising. Addition- ally Charles .Tucker asked BBDO to develop SOSAS pro- motional ideas (e.g. carton stuffers). Based on the March 28 meeting, BBDO forwarded revised "corporate Profit" and "Basic" ads to Charles Tucker on March 31. : April 1978 A work session was held on April 5 with~Charles Tucker at BBDO. New courtesy ads ("Look Before You Light") were presented including small space ads, outdoor, and POP examples. Additionally, several examples introducing courtesy into existing ads were presented, a].ong with updated promotional materials (booklets and cartoon stuffer "dummies"). Charles Tucker requested revised copy for the courtesy ad, additional -20-

booklets addressed to the family (i.e. employees, salesmen, growers), and examples of current ads which included people. Tl~ese requests were developed and forwarded to Charles Tucker in April. On April ii Phase I of the Segmentation Study .(Social/Regulatory focus groups) was approved. The Phase I objective was to identify and evaluate key .population segments relevant to the tobacco industry. On April 15 correspondence from W. McGuire confirmed that attitudes can be changed on social issues through only one presentation of a persuasive communication. This input supported the BBDO research design for test.i~g SOSAS ads, On April 27, W. Shinn approved using "Health Hazard" in the basic ad. This ad (the California ad) would be tested along with the basic "disease" ad and courtesy ad. May 19"]8 On May 2, Edelman Inc. issues its rationale for no~ forming a Smokers' Alliance. The primary reason was that people con~ider the "right to smoke" argument as weak. Call fornla" On May 16, a revise~ " " " (health hazard) ad was forwarded to Charles Tucker. ~

On May 25,-~BDO forwarded a summary of secondary sources identifying problems and opportunities in countering the alleged health costs and productivity losses related to smoking. Results were received in May from the Roper Study sponsored by the Tobacco" Institute. The study con- firmed the importance of the passive smoking issue (2/3 non-smokers,. 1/2 smokers believe) and the need for developing and publicizing medical evidence to the contrary. Additionally there appeared to be growing acceptance of more government involvement in the regulation of smoking. phase of the larger Segmentation Study. The purpose was to identify possible population segments against which to target future SOSAS efforts. No new infor- mation was obtained" as the research could not identify any special group sympathetic to tobacco industry positions. June 1978 Since it was decided to research the ads under some sort of test conditions (laboratory or test market), print ads were also created along wit]] three other approaches -- "Courtesy," "Corpora{-ion Profit," and "Hea].th Hazard '~ ~ O -22-

A representative ad of the three campaigns was tested. Each ad was measured as to its ability to shift public attitudes toward smoking issues. The "Basic Disease" ad caused large positive attitude shifts in the general population and directionally positive shifts among opinion leaders. ~he "Health Hazard" ad had directionally positive results. "Courtesy" and • . "Corporate Profits" had little effect on shift in attitude. On June 29, W. McGuire reported that he had reviewed the results of the attitude shift research of the three SOSAS ads tested. W. McGuire agreed that the methodology worked t.:~ll and with the con~l,~ that the t~;o "passive smoking" ads had sizeable attitude shifts while the "courtesy" ad was not particularly successful. Oo July 1978 On July 17 Agency Management addressed the Tobacco Institute and presented BBDO's position on why passive smoking was the key SOSAS issue over ii other viable directions. Additionally Mr. Dillon reiterated why the specific ads should be straight forward and "non-slick."

In July BBD0 developed three alternative SOSAS media plans at different budget levels with each targeted against adults involved in any public activity (e.g. voted, etc.). August 1978 In August, the Tobacco Institute tested the "Basic Disease" ad in newspapers in E1 Paso, Texas and Madison, Wisconsin. The ads ran in the morning and evening editions for four days over a one month period. Results were inconclusive since the ad generated only 7% awareness, due in part to its minimal media schedule. A third tracking of the proposed California re- striction was conducted in August. Attitudes were still positive towards the restriction, but attitude was amenable to change if meaningful arguments against the restriction could be communicated. Additionally it appeared that passive smoking as an issue can change attitude, but still may not change behavior (i.e. voting intention). September 1978 In September', 1978, a Tobacco Forum ~.as held by several Southeastern Congressmen to provide public documentation of passive smoking medical, facts. The p~-ess 9enerally downplayed the Forum and .~ts expert testimony due to the fact t]~at fandly ]egis-- lators wel:e conduct~.ng the procedure. - 24-

Oc[~ober 1978 At a meeting on October 3 it was reaffirmed to discontinue the Segmentation Study. Information still desired from the Study by Public Affairs will be gathered by more specific research designs. In early October, results of attitudinal research conducted by Civic Service among the "family" were presented. RJR employees differ significantly from the general population regarding attitude towards SOSAS issues. It was decided to undertake an educational effort among RJR employees. November 1978 Final research in the California Pr~position 5 campaign indicated that "Government Interference", "Government Cost", and specific attacks on the "ridiculous" aspects of Proposition 5 were the most effective California issues. Proposition 5 lost in every California-County and lost statewide by a 54% to 46% vote..