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SOSAS REVIEW February i0, 1978

SOSAS REVIEW o-.-. ~ " " AGENDA "February 10, 1978 - " Appendix. . I. Introduction and Background IIo Califano Issue D. ~urden A. Appraisal of Where We Are o B. Strategy C. Governor'.s Meeting • .. (Hunt Position Paper} " IIIo ACS N~tlonal Commission on F.H." Christopher, Jr. Smoking and Public Pollcy • Update IV. Nonsmoker Forum M.H. Crohn, Jr° • . Ao The Issue B. Industry Response - • Alternatlves (German symposium) " '" ~ • Witnesses . V. Publlc Relations Update" R. Sustana. .. VI. Public Affairs ~pdate D. Durden -.--. VII. Advertising Strategy T. D~llon " and Alternatives D. McLo.ughlin VIII Next Steps and Timetable J.R. Peterson ~

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SOSAS REVIEW February 10, 1978 The last time we met, we reviewed an updated Charter for this work. -The first three paragraphs of this Charter are worth reviewing to focus in on the work that is being carried out: SOSAS is a feasibility study of a long-term, inten- Sive, nationwide effort by the.Tobacco Indust~v pointed at the closely related issues of passive smoking, restrictions on smokers, and the social acceptability of smoking and smokers. Its purpose is to determine what programs, if any, should be implemented to educate, communicate, and mobilize support on behalf of smokers, smoking, and the entire tobacco conmlunity. It is designed to proclaim the truth about the rights of smokers and nonsmokers alike. Overall, it is intended to reassert the Tobacco Industry's position and its public credibility as it relates to the Issues of social acceptability. In other words, it is the charge to this group to carry out an exhaustive study of what can be done to turn.the tide of public opinion that has built up over the past 20 to 25 years. We are In the process of searching out viable programs through the avenues of: - Direct consumer con~nunlcation - Public Relations and - Public Affairs Because of the preponderance of public opinion, which is negative to the Industry, there is great do~vnside rlsk connected with any program that we identify and develop but the future of the Industry warrant~ the effort.

SOSAS REVIEW - February I0, 1978 Page 2 tte will be covering a number of key elements of this work this morning. CONFIDENTIAL AND/OB PRIVILEGEI~ • FOBMATIDN HAS BEEN ~E[.ETEP Before we turn to the agenda, ] would like to touch on what has been accomplished in the eight months since this group was formed and started this effort. In net, through the work of SOSAS, the Industry is unified and is moving far more a~.ressivel_~_, under RJR's leadership. If nothing more comes from this work, the benefit would be well worth the effort. Some of the progress resulting from this effort can be summed up in the following points: " Clearer understanding of the problems confronting the Industry and an appreciation of the consequences. • Unity of the Industry, • Reorganization of T.I. and Programing. Broadened focus of work and moved to a more aggressive posture. • T.A.N, • ICOSl ° Recognition of possible role of Brand Advertising. Development of data bank on economic impact of industry by Congressional District. This is basically a lobbying tool, but a powerful one. • Recognition of non-smoker issue and program development. • Effective program to deal with Califano Program. • Effective program to deal with ACS Target 5 Program.

SOSAS REVIEW February ]0, Page 3 In review, we have moved from a planning and learning mode to one of action -- not action for action's sake, but action that is based on strategies that are well thought out and carefully considered in terms of negative or dovmside effects, as well as upside potential. The agenda for todaY's meeting deals with two basic issues: - The Califano Program - The Non-Smoker Issues Dennis will start out with a report on the Califano issue.

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28 JAT(LL~J~Y 1978 DURDEN SLIDE 4 SOSAS REVIEW ~EETII~G OF FEBRUARY I0, 1978 SU~;~J~RY OF RJR AND I~DUSTRY INITIATIVES (~CO~,'PLE'[ED _AN[).PROPOSED) IN THE CALIFANO AFFAIR * T.I.'S PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE * T.I.'S SYSTEMATIC FO{LO-W-UPS 0,~ CALIFARO OUTREACH * T.I. 'S "FAMILY" ADS * RJR'S CORPORATE-WIDE GRASSROOTS MAIL PROGRAM * V#~IL FROM FRIEI~DS OF THE COMPANY AND INDUSTRY * RJR'S Q. & A. SHEET * RJR'S BACKGROUI~D PAPER FOR TOBACCO-STATE GOVERNORS * RJRT'S TOP ~tANAGE!,IENT LETTERS TO REGIONAL PAPERS AND SYt~DICATED COLUI.I;II STS * RJR'S BRIEFING PAPER FOR COLIN STOKES' MEETING WITH CALIFANO * RJR'S FOLLOW-UP BRIEFING PAPERS FOR: * TOBACCO 1RADE * FAPJ4ER CO~UNITY * FI~ANCIAL COI,~IU~ITY * RJR'S SPECIAL INITIATIVES WITH STATE AGRICULTURAL SECRETARIES * OTHER ACTIVITIES

28 J/V~UARY 1978 DUP, DEfI SLIDE 5 • "" SOSAS REVIEW ~EETING OF FEBRU~RY I0, 1978 KEY ISSUES HIGHLIGH'~ED B._~_Y CAL~IFAI~O'S ACTIONS ~ARNII~G LABELS EXCISE IAX ]HCREASES uON,INuAT,ON TOBACCO SUPPORT PROGP,~I .... S~KII~G EDUCATIO~ PROGP, AMS GROWING EI~PHASIS ON SOCIAL COSTS THRUSTS RESPONSE OF OTHER CO~4PANIES TO CALIFANO POL]IICAL IMPACTS OF A DECLINING ~RKET A I~EW SURGEOI~ GENERAL'S REPORT

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ~ - ON SMOKING AND PUBLIC POLICY • National Commission announced report at a news conference in New York City on January 31. • This so-called Blue-Ribbon Commission was appointed by the American Cancer Society in October, 1976, and charged with gathering testimony from all over the country in order to develop a "public mandate against cigarette smoking.." • Media coverage of the news conference was extensive in the New York area; however, none of the nationalTV broadcasters covered the conference. • Press coverage around the country has been spotty. For example, Washington Post had no mention of National Commission news conference°

NEWS CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS • The ACS's central goal should be to move "as rapidly as possible toward a nonsmoking society." " • The "cigarette industry in the United States is essentially ° unregulated" and "unaccountable to any agency of government for the content of its products or the health consequences of their USeo" • "Despite its own findings and warnings about the hazards of cigarette smoke, the response to this problem by the federal government on both congressional and executive levels has been minimal and symbolic." It described the failure to regulate the cigarette industry as a "national disgrace." • The Commission also singled out the ACS, saying that the group "has not used its potential resources to the fullest, parti- -~cularly in the area of public policy."

• The panel's recommendations included a laundry list of ideas fox.regulation and education: (a) Establish a cabinet-level committee on smoking and health. (b) Phase ou£ over a 10-year period the Tobacco Price-Support System. (c) Eliminate tobacco products from those exported under the Food for Peace Program° (d) Pay for an anti-smoking media advertising campaign through the Department of HEW. -(e) Replace the federal excise tax with an increased graduated tax based on tar and nicotine content. (f) The Federal Trade Commission should obtain an agreement from tobacco companies to eliminate the use of human models in advertising and to cease advertising cigarettes that produce more than 10 mg. of tar and 0.7 mg. of nicotine per cigarette. ~g) The FTC also should require a more explicit warning on • cigarette packages, and advertising and labeling should ...... be expanded to include the carbon monoxide content of smoke° 2

(h) The Department of Labor should ensure workers of a smoke-free environment° (i) M~litary establishments should discontinue the sale of tax-free.cigaretteso .(j) State and local governments were encouraged to restrict smoking in public places, to enforce ban on c~garette sales to minors, and to use part of their cigarette tax revenues to combat smoking. Elementary and secondary • schools were encouraged to conduct comprehensive anti- smoking education programs and establish stop-smoking clinics. (k) Physicians and other health professionals were urged to do more to discourage patients from smoking and to use their influence on legislators considering smoking regulations.

AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY BOARD OF DIRECTORS • Following the National Commission's news conference, Commission members presented their report to the ~ull ACS Board. Pre- sentation basically the same as that used at news conference. • After formal presentation, each Commission member ~ade short statement as to importance of their findings, how sure they were of evidence, etc. Mention was made of the long and arduous discussions the Commission had had about whether they should recommend prohibition of smoking° • In the discussion following the Commission's report Mr. Paul Williams, ACS Board member from New York City and Chairman of NYC ACS (also former State supreme court Justice), expressed some serious concerns about the Commission report° He stated that if the ACS Board accepted the report, "this meant a change in the ACS's role as an education and scientific organi- zation to a cohesive political organization." He went on to ~ay that the ACS had never been "repressive" and that "we are • an anti-cancer society and not an anti-smoking society." • The ACS Board meeting concluded with the National Commission's report being formally accepted, with the comment that it would be discussed further to decide which parts the ACS wanted to adopt°

TOBACCO INSTITUTE'S RESPONSE • TI staff as well as representatives from the tobacco companies attended all National Commission forums. • Committee was formed of TI staff and member company representatives to analyze all testimony at the hearings and to identify key issues. • • On each of the key issues identified, position papers have been developed. • • In net, TI is now prepared in good part. to defend itself on issues emanating out of the ACS hearings.

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COICFIDENTIllL ItNDIOj~ pGltll|.~GEl~

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PUBLIC RELATIONS UPDATE The public relations function, including internal and external resources, has now had several mo~ths experience with SOSAS which has been characterized by a continuing series of false starts and hopes. But these months have been a wprthwhile educational experience because we hav~ -- through our own efforts and by sharinq the experience of the other disciplines engaged in the project -- made considerable p[ogress. We have learned a great deal about the nature and depth of the problem confronting us.. We have ]earned a great deal about the viability of the many courses of action open to us. And -- of primary importance -- we have gained much broader appreciation and understanding of the r]sks involved in any contemplated action. We started the SOSAS effort with benefit of our internal pnblic relations staff and the input of our two regularly retaine~ public relations consultants. Last September, we retained the firm of Daniel Ede]man to assist us in the development of a program. In some respects, we perhaps, retained the Edelman agency prematurely. It would have been unfair to expect an outside agency to develop a program while the research data upon which their program would depend was st~ll being compiled through other departments. However, the complexity and sensi- tivity of the issue we are Working on required us to give the Ede]man agency sever~l months lead time to become thoroughly familiar with our problem and to stay abreast of the interim findings of the other groups engaged in SOSAS. -more-

-2- Edelman has participated in th~s educational process • . . and gone one step further by conductin~ a preliminary study of news media attitudes. It was important to the Edelman firm to know more about the positiQn of editors and commentators regarding smoking and health -- because these are the people through whom they will ultimately have to disseminate their materials in our behalf. Their findings, incidentally, indicated the attitudes among news media p~rsonnel toward smoking issues are not as firmly entrenched as they are among the general public. This was particularly true on the passive smoking question. The past several months have also brought us a clearer understanding of the public relations role in the SOSAS effort. We know now that many projects will evolve in which public rela- tions will be the originator and prime mover, dependent upon the other professions involved in the overall effort for counsel and support. But in an at least equal number of specific actions, public relations will provide the counsel and support to others. However, public relations will have its own crucial role once any other area accomplishes an objective. For . example, a'position advanced by the legal department, an ad series launched or a one-to-one contact by public affairs that produces fruit, must be seized upon by public relations to assure all appropriate exploitation and optimum dissemination. From the public relations view, we totally accept the ever stronger belief that we can do nothing to improve the -more-

social acceptability of smoking unless we can successfully turn the growing belief that passive smoking is harmful to the nonsmoker. Therefore, we concur hea[tily and are giving top priority to working toward creating an appropriate public foru~ through which we can establish the facts about passive smoking. The advisability and potehtial success of an~ follow- up activity will depend on the effectiveness and believability of the material emanating from this forum. However, while plans are being formulated to stage this forum, we are already looking at a number of other follow-up activities. The Edelman agency has given us a proposal to ~stablish a smoking and health news bureau in New York City. The function of the news bureau will be to monitor the media nationwide and respond to every publica- tion or broadcast of false or misleading information. The bureau would also brief editors and commentators on the facts on an ongoing basis, and. respond swiftly to rash, unfounded charges by our critics. Addit~onally, the Edelman firm is exploring possible .use of documentary films both on a broad distribution basis and in terms of mpre specific films aimed at key influential audiences. We are also exploring programs attempting to capitalize on courtesy and other auxiliary themes, but as I said, these cannot be considered or launched until we have successfully conducted our public forum on passive smoking. ~nternally we have gained approval and are searching for a full time smoking and health expert to be added to the public relations staff. This expert will monitor and -more-

coordinate all the smoking and health activity being conducted internally and externally and provide broad support to all of the elements engaged in SOSAS. The posit~on papers our depart- ment prepared on Califano's announcement and similar white papers to provide necessary background and support throughout ou~ company on this subject will be one primary responsibility of this new individual. One additional area of activity which we feel warrants high priority is the restructuring or reorganizing of institute to allow us to implement SOSAS activities through the Tobacco Institute. We do not want RJR to act as a l.ightning rod on this issue, and to assume, when we do not need to, all of the potential downside risks. "Additionally, the Tobacco Institute. is one step further removed from the profit motive and can hop~fully speak with greater credibility. ~n closing, let me point out that the past several months have given us even greater appreciation for the diffi- culty we face in taking any action. Our opponents can act irrationally and even wantonly insome cases and do so under a banner of righteous indignation, and in defense of the public well being. Everything we do must first escape the label of profiteer and insensitive corporate money grubber. Additionally, we gave the opposition a 300-year head start because that's just. how long the controversy has been going on virtually unanswered, and, of course, the intensity of the attacks against us have grown severely during the past 20 years. -more-

The head start we gave our. opponent's and the fact that we must go into this battle almost with on~ hand tied behind us are serious from the public relations standpoint. The p~rcentage of people responding "yes" to a leading question that passive smoking can be harmful doesn't tell us how intensely they feel about the issue, what priority the concern may have in their m~nds, or whether ~t affects their social behavior. [Furthermore, the scheduling and control that can be brought to play in selling a product or electing a candidate are not available to the public relations function on this issue in most instances. We are going to seek to cause the needle to rise sharply on a controversial, emotion-laden public issue, but our public relations job is not over the day the product goes down the street or on election day. We have to keep that needle in a high position with no specific target date or action in mind. And finally, just as every accomplishment by another department engaged in SOSAS gives us a potential public relations opportunity, so does it represent a potential problem if mis- interpreted by the public. We feel in all of our activities we must go to extra- ordinary lengths to monitor public reaction and maintain the cap~city to swiftly and credibly abort troublesome projects.

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28 JAIIU.~,RY 1978 DURDEN . SLIDE Z SOSAS REVIEW V~EETING OF FEBRUARY I0, 1978 KEY FIt:DIIIGS OF SOSAS PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH TO DATE: "PUBLIC" THEMES DIFFERENT FROM "LOBBYING" TH, EHZS T.I. CA, N STILL "FIGHT FIRES" WITH LOBBYING THEMES LItIITED NUI.IBER OF EFFECTIVE PUBLIC THEMES "LAY-BACK" STRATEGY ALWAYS OPEN TO US ANY CA]'IPAIGN EFFORTS I,~UST BE II~'DUSTRY, NOT CDI~PANY SHORT-IERI'I RISKS HIGH ~(0 QUICK VICTORY--BEST EXPECTATION IS TO START TURNING TIDE RESOLVING PRItlARY HEALTH ISSUE IS LONG-RANGE KEY BASIC SMOKING At(D HEALTH RESEARCH MUST CONTINUE I(0 EASY I~LAY PERHAPS NOT EVEN A HARD ONE I,E)RTH THE RISK IIIESE KEY FINDINGS FOR}I THE BACKGROUt(D "GIVENS" FOR CURRENT ISSUES.

28 JANUARY I918 DURDEN • SLIDE 3 SOSAS REVIEW MEETING OF FEBRUARY I0, 1978 KEY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ISSUES CURRENTLY FACING SOSAS THE CLUSTER OF I.IETHODS ISSUES: (1) CAMPAIGN VS. SCATTERED ACTIONS (2) LIMITED CHOICE OF CAMPAIGN MEIHODS (3) POLITICAL I,IETHOD OR MODEL (4) iIHICH "DIALS" TO READ THE CLUSIER OF MESSAGE ISSUES: (1) BREAKING THE "CANCER" BARRIER (2) LIMITED NU~.~BER OF MESSAGE THEMES (3) CONTROL OF COUNTER MESSAGES (4) SPONSORSHIP OF MESSAGES THE CLUSTER OF F~DIA ISSUES: (1) POLITICALLY "WARM" MEDIA UNAVAILABLE (2) POLITICALLY "COLD" MEDIA QUESTIONS (3) ONE "IVAR~I" MEDIU~ POSSIBLY OPEN (4) AVAILABILITY OF POLITICALLY "LUKE-WAP,,M" MEDIA THE CLUSTER OF MANPOWER ISSUES: (1) MERCE~IARIES VS. VOLUNTEERS (2) ~:OBILIZIRG S~TOKERS AS A RIGHTS GROUP (3) MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION POTENTIALS (4) DEPLOYMENT OF OUR TROOPS THE BALANCE OF SOSAS PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH WILL CO~ITI~IUE TO INVESTIGATE THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO PRESENT CONCLUSIONS AND RECO~,~ENDATIONS ABOUT THEM TO RJR SENIOR ~tLAGEMENT.

Appendix VII 50000 8933

28 JANU~Y 1978 DURDEN SLIDE 4 SOS, AS REVIEW I'~ET]NG OF FEBRUARY 10, 1978 SUMHARY OF RJR AND INDUSTRY INITIATIVES (~OMPLETED AND PROPOSED) IN JH~ CALIFANO AFFAIR • • T.I.'S PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE • T.I.'S SYSTEMATIC FOLLOW-UPS ON CALIFANO OUTREACH • : . • RJR'S CORPORAIE-WIDE GRASSROOTS MAIL PROGRAM • MAIL FROM FRIENDS OF 1HE C~4PANY @did INDUSIRY • RJR'S Q. & A. SHEET ' • RJR'S BACKGROUtID PAPER FOR TOI~ACCO-STATE GOVERNORS •RJRT'S 10P MANAGEMZNT LETTERS TO REGI~Le, L PAPERS AJ~D SYNDICATED COLUmnISTS • RJR'S BRIEFING PAPER FOR COLIN STOKES' HEETING WITH CALIFANO - • RJR'S FOLLOW-UP BRIEFING PAPERS FOR: • IOBACCO IRADE • FARMER CO~I4UNITY ... • FINANCIAL COMMUNITY • RJR'S SPECIAL INITIATIVES WITH STATE AGRICULTURAJ. SECRETARIES .. '" • OIHER ACTIVITIES

ADVERTISING ST~TEGY AND ALTERNATI~S T]IE PR OB ] New And-smok~n~ forces ha~n~ concluded [ha£ "e4ucadn~" people about [he health hazards of smoMn~ is ineffective, have developed a eompu~Mon. Th~s s~rafe~y ~nvolves ]e~s$~adon [o eHm[na[e smo~n~ areas in wblch smo]dnz }s now ze~arded as accep[ab]e, and by eneoura~[n~ non-s~okezS ~o apply social pressure on ~ndivh]ua]s ¢mok~n~ in their presence. The Key Element of the Strategy . The key to the success of this strategy is that a majority of people already believe that non-smokers can get serious diseases from the actlxdties of sn]okers. If this is accepted as fact, then a smoker is no longer able to defend Iris practice on the ground that he is the only person who can be harmed by his personal decision to smoke. If this is ihe case, then the smoker is psychologically and legally in the position of indiscriminately using a lethal weapon against innocent by- , standers.

~_y_Vh_=a_~en.~ If Thir. Sir,ale .,,/D_" Succee.ds? If thi~ is allowed to stand unrcfuted, thcn it is only a matter of time before smoking is restricted everywhere, including the home, and ulthnale][ efforts ~]1 be n~ade ~o rcs£rlct the manufac~re, trans- porMfion and sales of tobacco products. Fortunately, the allegation that smoking causes disease,s not true, • % and there is no medical evidence in support of such a theory. Unfortunately, the fact remains that already 71% o}non-smokers and 51% of smokers believe this falsehood. These percentages may be expected to increase, since it is the strategy of the anti-smoking forces to design propaganda which will reinforce these beliefs, without actually stating that smokers cause disease in non-smokers. Ambiguous terms like "nox-lous" and "pollutSon~" arc certainly effective in accomplishing this. }low Can This Str___at__qg_y Be Effecdvel_y Countered? No counter-strategy can Succeed unless we are able to refute the falsehood about non-smokers being subject to disease. ~ 0 0

Here is a list of possible positions and strategies that have been considered. I. Medical exgdence of smoldnt~ health effects on the smoker is inconclusive. 1Eliminated because: Both smokers and non-smokers already hold convictions to the contrary, and see ihewarning label as the tobacco manufactaarer's ag'reemcnt. Research indicates 56~/0 of smokers and 835'0 of non-smokers say most smokers v.;ill geta serious illness. In any event, there is no prospect of reversing the public point of view in time to prevent x~idespread anti- smoking legislation. 2. The tobacco industry is essential to the economy_t_~en_~_ployment., tax revenues[ etc. Rejected because: Research clearly shows that the public is prepared to sacrifice economy if health is at stake. Tobacco Institute survey among hJgh income and rural population of tobacco states Mmxvs 47% believe smoking should be banned in all public places~ both before and after ads stressing economic importance of industry.

3. ]~_~!_~d__h_eD'~_tL~i'_of the tobacco industry. Rejected because: It is not relevant to the issue of restrlctSons on smoking. 4. ff_m_pk.~ng in moderation. Rejected because: It addresses itself to the hea]th of the smoker but notnecessari]y to the health of the non-smoker. In any event, unlike the case of liquor, there is nox~ddcspread standard for moderation or excess in smoking. Here, legal problems are involved in any attempt to suggest what might be considered a "moderate" consumption. ft. ~T_~he__ri~.ht to rnagket our product fairly and impart~all~L~ Rejected because: The public does not concede the right to manufacture something which in their opinion causes a serious . disease among non-users. 0

6. ~_~_o£i~h,z~o~fjLoj~:}t~on ~Hsf]ed v,,ilh current condilions on ~)~!okin~/non-smol.:in,q ~,nd no further Eovernment re!~ulation is requircq. Rejected: ~8% of non-smokers beSieve that the government should further restrict smo]dng and only I/3 o£ smokers ~vill be bothered if there are more rcstricHons. 72% of smokers expect more laws to be passed and 38% of smokers believe they will be passed to protect non-smokers' health. 7. The tobacco industry has contributed to and is interested in pbjecdve unbiased medical research. Rejected because: Th~s does not address the question of additional laws against smokers. 8. The smoker is a ~ood cuy, courteous, not messy~ a friend, doesn't smoke where he shouldn't. Rejected: Non-smoker clearly.perceives that every smoker is not a good guy and that if his health is at stake, he cannot rely upon the s~noker not to smoke in his presence.

9. Smolders' P,~.~h_t.5.. (l_'rcedorn of Choice} ]mportaat but subsidiary: There is public accepta~ce that sn~okers ha're rights bu~ not ~o the extent that their smoking seriously affects ~l,e health of others. ~us, itmust ~irst be established that smoking is not harmful to ~bn-smokers' health. ]0. Smolder couriesy_ ~portant but subsidiary: If an individual believes that l~is life is at stake, hc ~dll not depend upon the courtesy of smokers to preserve it, Courtesy is a suitable explanation if smoking ~s merely an annoyance to the non-smokcr~ but it is not a suitable ~csponse if it is believed that it causes disease ~n non-smokers. II. Smoker /non- sn~olCer ~problem can be worked out on an indlx6dual bas~s x~gthout ~overnn~ent interference. Important but subsidiary: The public clearly see that ~f the smoker is achaally causing d~scase among ~mn-smokcrs, individual arrangements will not cover all the contingencies. This position is only tenable when smoke is regarded as a mere annoyance. 0 0

12. Tol~ac.co s~ol:e has no effc:ct on the l~ealih of non-sn3ol:er.~. Valid because: The evidence is that the preponderance of doctors believe this. It can be effective if substantiation is adequate. By thd process ofellminat-ion, there appears to be only one control strategy which is l~kely to affect the outcome of the present anti- smoldng propaganda. " The most vulnerable aspect of this propaganda ~ffor~ is that they are using the soft lie techrdquc about disease among non-smolders. There is, as far as we knoxv at this time, not even a controversy on thcissue ofnon-~mokers contracting disease. NO one qucstlons that other people's smoke can bc annoying. -There is some medical opinion that indixdduals ~nay have transitory physical discomfort and some rather vague assumptions on the part of some medical authorities that people ~fith certain prc-ex~st-lng conditions could possibly be affected by ambient smoke.

Tiffs ~ ~ far s~ron~er pos~on fl~n c~n be c~b]~hed on the effect~ of ~omh~ upon smokers. The ]~t~cr i~ au unresolved conLrover~y about s~Hst~c~] h~ference, bu~ the preponderance of the medical profession e~dent]y attribute causa]~ to smo]dng by smokers. ]n lhe case of non-smokers, there is no controversy.over st.a~sfica] Sn~erence. As far as the public Ss concerned, they are in no position to analyze sfa/jslical material. For all practical purposes, they rely on the preponderance of the opinion of medical authorities. The exddence from our research is that it would be i:nportant to have as much hard evidence as possible to demonstrate that medical authorities every, where and under all Circumstances firmly believe that no disease can be transmitted to non-smokers. At present, a material handicap is the number and availability of author~tles who can be specifically quoted ~qthout 'con'~plicatlng reservations. .A subsidiary concern is the extent to wlfich these authorities can be quoled and identified x~dthout pern'dssion xvlfich may not, in all cases, be forthcoming.

A ~ew i~gredicnt lhat has entered ihe equation s~nce the ~esearch ~; completed is that Secre[ary Cal~/ano has crysMlized the issue by calling x,l)on the ~ovcrnors and lcgJs]ah, rcs el the various ~latcs to pass laws bannJn~ smoking in p~blic places. While we do not have research directly applying t6 tMs issue, there a considerable indication fron~ other sources that there is x~dcsprcad pub]Jc opposition to passing tmncccssary laws, particularly unnecessary ~cdera] laws. In the case of anti-s]v, okh~g ]axvs, however, it is ~Icar that a very sub- s~ntJa] body of the public does believe that smo~ng causes disease non-smokers. They are likely to support anti-s~o~n~ lairs even though ihcy n~ay believe t~at they are prac~ca]]y unenforceable against div]dua]s. They are, however, clear]y enforceable against corporations, ahd bus~ncss places. The anti-smoking [orccs are truly axware of the potential ofheax~, fines agains~ resultants, factory oxm~ers, etc. One forhmate aspect of the Califano statement is that it crystalizes thc anti-smo~dng s~t-aation in tcrms o.f the threat of specific lcgislation against smoking on the grounds that legislation is reqt~ired to prevent physical harm to the non-smoker,

~hat must tlm an.~xver of 1he tobacco industry be? As the research on the foregoing di.~cu~sion has indicated, virt~aallyonly one message that can .be transmitted to the public and the legislators has any lihe- lihood of altering the l'ut~are course of events. To put it in the'form ofa lelegram, itm~ast read something like this: OT]]ER PEOPLE'S CIGARETTE SMOKE CANNOT CAUSE DISEASE ]N NON-SMOKERS. There is nothing sacred about the wording of th~s statement but certain elements are important. " The phrase "cause d~scasc" is cri~cal. While it may be more at- tractive to say "affect thehealth~ " it is extremely doubtful that we can get a consensu~ as to what constitutes hcaltho @here are some doctors who would maintain that personal irritation, physical or mental, is unhealthy, t-lowcvcr~ the public~ as our research ind~catcs~ sees that non-smokers will get such lh~ngs as lung cancer, emphysema~ nausea~ chronic bronchitis and heart d~sease as a d~rect result ~f breathing other people's clgarette smoke.

l~ wc ~se *°a.l'~'ect h~a]th~ b~ our communJcat-~on0 we ant~-smo "ldng group an opportunity to destroy our position by quota:t:io~s from authorities who choose to ~nterpret health by a ~nique set slandards. Instant substantiation must accompany the above message. The tobacco industry clearly suffers from a present credibility pr,~sblem on the issue of srnol~cr~s health -- reflected in our qualitative rcs.e:arch. Quotations from single authorities can and v¢ill be perceived as being chosen selectively by the tobacco industry to the exclusion of other" authorities which hold opposite v'iews. .'We need, for con"~mun~cations purposes, concise ~nd believable . - substantiation to accompany our message. At the moment this is our weakest llnk. ~¢Vhile "we have a large file of substantiat-ion, many of the statements are poorly phrased and frill of qualifications. The public may have no way of assessing validity of the sources, even in those cases where we can give clew " attribution.

Wc must lhcn consider whether we have any alternative to our present suLstant~a~Jon base. C~c alternat-ivc is research conducted by im- peccably authoritative sources on the opinions of medical experts. The question that We need to have medical experts answer must be framed unequivocally. For example: "Do you have any evidence that non-sm'okers can contract any disease from other people smoking in the same area? " " "Can you cite any specific medical research that would support the belief that non-smokers contract disease from other people smoking in the same area? ~ These are perfectly legitimate questions demanding a yes or no answer. At this point it seems highly unlikely that many medical authorities can answer them in the affJrmat-ivc. Time The ~ssue to be faced hereis whether there is time to complete such research quickly enough to be effective against ant~-smoldng propaganda. An alternative is to go with the material that ~ve now have ~vhich is ~ubjcct to some credibility problcms and the possible neccssit-~ of qualifying statements on pre-eMstSng afflictions.

We can~ of course~ move on both fronts and phase into mo~'e concise subsLanL~ation when it becomes available. 11ow do we commun{caie the central thought that l~undreds of ]aws • are not needed i,ecause brea_tlain~ ot~li__er__pe.ople~s tobacco s~oke does not cause disease? There is no need to go into the obvious ways in wlfich this message can be communicated to ]egis]atbrs, thought leaders and others that can be reached by mail or face to face. But the problem ~s here that although face to face communication may slow do|,na the ]egislatbve process~ we can be swamped by a voter open, on over time. It is certainly no secret that legislators are highly responsiv~ to public opinion polls though they may personally have grave doubts about the validity of public opinion. The anti- ~moldng forces vAll unquestionably generate public opinion polls. The data we see reflected in our own research could demonstrate to legislators {hat it is political suicide not io enact restrictive legislation.

]>erhaps mostimport~,nt, it will be vital to reach s~aol~ers with an ironclad defense of their position. At lhe present time the research clearly indicates that a majority of smol~crs believe that they are causing d~sease in others and are defenseless against such an al.legation. They naust be furnished this information and furnished it qu~cl-dy.before its acceptance becomes hardened. The l~ey conamunicat]ons problem we have is how to reach not thousands of legislators alone, butmillions of voters whowillbe on public opinion records. . . The problem we have here is that due to the anti-smoking propagandists~ we have comparatively Httle access to mass media. Secretary Gal~fano can instantly, and as the research shows, effect a communication to the entire country t]arough the Washington press corps. Experience ~ndicates that a reply.on the part of the tobacco industry w~ll be bu~'~ed. ]t is possible to theorize about debates on television and favorable editorials and other channels of communication, but the bitter truth about these is that they don't reach enough people..

Credibiliiy is high but readership is low. It is vlrh, ally in~l)OS,Mble to create the reach and frequency in the communication reply through the editorial side of a mass communication system, when you are defending yourself against a mass government and activist attack. What about advertising? Advertising has the oppoMte difficulty. has relatively low credibility, but has the capacity for very h~gh reach and frequency of a communication. Unfort~nately, the most effective form of advertising in a communlcat~ion on Folit-ical matters is closed to the tobacco industry on this controversy. Television is highly effective in controverMes because, to a large extent, television can get across its point whether the v~ewer is voluntarily interested in this subject or not. But the only available channel open to th6 tobacco industry is print advertising where its message, if complicated or difficult, can easily bc ignored. There arc additional problems to advcriSsing. One is that the IRS has held that corporate advertising for the purpose of influencing legislation cannot bc d~ductcd as a business expense.

Anoiher factor that may be involved, especially if quotation o£ author]tles is indicated, {s that New York State, fo'r examp]c, has laws forbidding the use of names of people in advertising for trade or commercial p~rposcs without their consent. But: by far the greatest problem with advertising in publications, is one of credibility. This hearts that there is a very high need for .clear and unmistakable substantiation of statements made. This adds to complicaHons because it is necessary to include them in the advertisement itself which creates the problem of potentially long and forbidding copy that resists readership. The Anti-Smokln& Counterattack In a propaganda sit-oation, we must cor,~ider that whatever com- munication the industry decides tomake~ there ~411 be the probability of strong counterattack. If we employ adverlis~ng to get our message across, we may expec't a violent and v-ltupcrative reaction from anti-smo "Mng propagandists°

it js vitally important that we consider what the wo)'.~t consequence of such an attack might be. It is po~;s.iblc that xve can make a strong point, yei be wdnerable to a severe counterattack t~at ~ould nullify any gains we might make. Te s fin_g_ If we decide to proceed on the above strategy, then we should have hard evidence that the change in atdta~de we are able to achieve .. warrants the expense and risks invoh, ed. It is our recommendation that the advertising messages that pass judgmental evaluation be tested under secure laboratory conditions to determine the degree ofattbdue shift that may be expected.. C~aly after doing so can we properly assess whether a test market operatbon is warranted." The test market operation carries with it the probability of a • counterattack belng started well ahead of any national or state effort, " ' and thereby blunting the content of our message. On the other hand, "real world" exposure will give us some data not easily observed in a laboratory situation. We think the risks and rewards of a tes~ market can best be seen after a laboratory cxpcrimont.

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S0SAS • ..... • .-- NEXT STEPS ~ COMPLETION DATE ADVERTI~;ING AND RESEARCH 1' ASSESS SCIENTIFIC SUBSTANTIATION FEB, 24 OF NONSMOKER ISSUE, • 2, ADVERTISING RESEARCH (PROJECTABLE APRIL 30 SAMPLE), 3, RESEARCH TO DETERMINE IMPACT CURRENT MARCH 10 ADVERTISING HAVING ON NONSMOKER, SEGMENTATION RESEARCH, O GENERAL PuBLIc JULY 15 O SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS. SEPT, 30 (GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS/MEDIA/ FARMERS/MEDICAL COMMUNITY)

SOSAS ..... NEXT STEPS .. C6MPLETI ON DATE NONSMOKER FORUM 1"," CONTINUE TO IDENTIFY MEDICAL ONGOING SCIENTIFIC WITNESSES, AND PREPARE STATEMENTS, 2, DECIDE ON BEST FORUM TO PRESENT MARCH 2 INDUSTRY SIDE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS i, GET FINAL RESEARCH REPORTS FROM MARCH 20 TWO REMAINING CONSULTANTS, 2,,-SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS, APRIL 10

SOSAS NEXT STEPS o " . COMPLETION DATE PUBLIC RELATION~ 1. EVALUATE AND ASSESS PRESENT TI APRIL15 CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT APPROPRIATE PR SOSAS ELEMENTS. • (INCLUDES EVALUATING NEED FOR PR COMMITTEE SIMILAR TO COM COM,) 2, RECOMMEND APPROPRIATESTRUCTURAL JUNE 1 C~HANGES TO TI, "; 3' AssisT IN DEVELOPMENT OF NONSMOKER JUNE 1 "FORUM," • 4. REFINE EDELFtAN PROGRAMS, AND ADAPT. ONGOING APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS (NEWS BUREAU~ ETC,)',"