Tobacco Documents Online

t MEMORANDUM i Re: Talk with General David Sarnoff - 19/9/64 On boarding American Airline's i0:i0 a.m. plane for Washington, D. C. on Wednesday, December 9, to attend a luncheon for Radio Free L~rope at the White House, I encountered General Sarnoff who was sitting alone. Since I had met him at the luncheon for Radio Free Europe, which was held by invitation of the late President Kennedy approximately a year ago, I assumed that the General was going to Washington for the same purpose as I. I sat beside him and identified myself, saying I wanted to take the opportunity to thank him for taking up the cudgel in behalf of the tobacco industry in his capacity as a member of the President's Committee on Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke. I told General Sarnoff I had read various reports ~n the trade press and felt that he was entitled to a vote of thanks from our industry. The General was pleased with my comment, but he made it clear that his position did not stem from the fact that the tobacco industry was a big advertiser on NBC; rather he said he was a champion of the free enterprise system and against what he referred to as "fanatics." He then said he wanted to tell me what happened. While he did not give specific dates, he said at one of the meetings of the President's Committee, at which a draft of its report was submitted for discussion, Emerson Foote was present. He heads up the Publ~c Relations Sub- Committee. Part of the report drafted by Foote was so un- acceptable to General Sarnoff in its condemnation of the cigarette industry in the statement that "cigarettes cause death," and further - if I understood him correctly - cigarette smoking and advertising should be outlawed, that he locked horns with Foote. He said that these statements were uncalled for, referred to them as the work of a fanatic, and made three points to the Committee because of his feelings: 1. He would resign from the Committee; or The report could be submitted to the President without his signature, in which case 3. He would write a very strong dissenting opinion

He said further that if cigarettes should be thus singled out, so should milk, butter and cream from the cholesterol standpoint; automobiles and airplanes from the accident standpoint; alcoholic beverages from the health standpoint. Apparently there was quite a heated exchange and Sarnoff was urged to stay on the Committee as a man who is held in high public esteem because of his good works for mankind, and as a man highly respected by President Johnson. It was the consensus of the Committee, to which Foote acceded, that the report could be modified in such a way as to permit General Sarnoff to sign it so that it would be a unanimous report. At this point Sarnoff said he felt no rewriting was necess- ary, simply give him a pencil and he would strike from the report that portion which he found objectionable. This he said he did personally, and the report to be submitted to President Johnson on December 15 will carry his signature, as well as those of the other members of the Committee, and it will contain nothing which has not already been said. General Sarnoff then made the point that all the discussion and everything to do with the work of the Committee was to be held highly confidential and was not to pass beyond the "closed door" behind which the Committee met. Subsequent to this, his office began to receive telephone calls from writers of I. F. Stone's Weekly, the Gallagher Report, and Advertising Age asking for comment on his part with regard to the disagreement which they had learned about. Sarnoff declined to make any comment, and was furious to think that news of what had transpired had leaked. He put"his own people" to work on it to trace the leak and they reported to him that the leak came through Foote. He has, therefore, put the stamp of distrust and dishonesty on Foote and has debated whether to - a. Issue a statement regarding his position; or b. Talk to President Johnson about Foote He has not reached a decision, but declared Foote as an arch-enemy, and then asked for my opinion and what I knew about Foote. The sense of what I told General Sarnoff is as follows: I had known Foote when he handled the American Tobacco account prior to George Hill's death. I had few direct dealings with him, but I said I could not understand how a man like Foote, who owed his wealth to the tobacco in- dustry, and particularly The American Tobacco Company,

n could take the position he had currently announced; further, I suspected that he was operating under the aegis of Mrs. Albert Lasker whose husband also accumulated a great deal of wealth through his association with American Tobacco particularly in the days of Lord & Thomas which was owned by Albert Lasker and which handled all cigarette advertising for American Tobacco. At this point General Sarnoff interrupted me to say that he and Mrs. Sarnoff had been for many years very dear friends of Mary Lasker. He too felt that Foote was operat- Ing under her aegis and he intended to see her with respect to Foote whom she was encouraging and whom he again re- ferred to as a fanatic. He made the further point that he had every reason to be on the team that fought cancer as his own wife had under- gone surgery for cancer five years ago (removal of a breast) and is considered to be cured; also, his brother died at the age of 60 of cancer. In any event, he said he was going to straighten out Mary Lasker's thinking or they would no longer be friends. I then returned to the matter of Foote and said I didn't know it for a fact but if he would put his people to work on it as he had on other matters, he might find that Foote had a long history of psychic troubles, having been under the care of psychiatrists off and on for a number of years, and I had heard that he had "been away" several times. I further reminded the General that one of the key figures in the book, "The Hucksters," written by Frederick Wakeman, had been repeshedly identified as Foote in advertising circles at least. I then attempted to cover in general terms the situation of the industry and the matter of timing if he were to work on an exposure of Foote; or indeed to talk to President John- son about Foote which could lead to his removal from the Public Relations Sub-Committee. I suggested that unless the timing was right, perhaps more harm than good might redound to all concerned. Sarnoff said that upon the release of the President's Committee report he hoped the industry would take affirma- tive action, and he suggested that our public relations people be alerted accordingly. I explained to him that we have a great dilemma; that we are in a bind in this matter, as we are in the whole situation, because any work by the public relations people in trying to put our best foote forward or put our side of the matter before the public had inherent problems; that the attorneys are greatly troubled by the implied warranty implications and the numerous cancer suits with which the industry is faced; and that anything we say carries with it the risk that it might come back to haunt us in future litigation. This

was a point the General seemed to understand quickly and accept readily. I then explained to him that certain legislation was pend- ing in Washington which I felt could be considered affirma- tive action once it had become fait accompli. I explained in general terms what our legislative situation is, what is on the launching pad, and that hopefully this legislation could and would be passed by mid-year 1965. I told him this was important in this whole situation; that we would be well advised, from our standpoint, to have this legis- lation passed before any possible explosions occur between Sarnoff and Foote which would be seized upon by the press and possibly have unfortunate results for us. The General said that he felt I had a point and again re- peated that he hoped we would take affirmative action to pull the teeth of some do-gooders and fanatics, of whom he classes Foote as A Number One. There was some further talk on the part of General Sarnoff about the fact that as a public-spirited man he found him- self much abused in the press, thanks to Foote; that he did not intend to forget it on the basis that if a fanatic like this is permitted to continue to operate, he could go from one product to another, cause chaos within an industry, and add to Government supervision and interference in all industry. He commented that his own industry had enough problems right now with the F.C.C. He also speculated that it was unfortunate there could not be better communication between both sides on the cancer question. He said he was largely exposed to the anti- tobacs, that they made some very strong points; but since he was convinced there was another side, he hoped we could find a way as time goes on for better rapport and communi- cation as he feels the public is entitled to know both sides and make its own Judgment. Both of us agreed that the cause of cancer is not known. Finally, he said to me that we should have lunch together soon and he would show me the report as it was originally drafted so I could see for myself what had been stricken from it by him. I said I would be glad to meet with him at any mutually convenient time, but up to this writing I have not heard further from him. I will conclude this report by saying that throughout the conversation General Sarnoff registered his distrust of Foote based on what had happened, Foote's Machiavellian tactics, his "oily manner," and his fanaticism which Sarnoff consistently referred to as dangerous. P

D 5 D NOTE: I should also state that on several occasions during our conversation General Sarnoff made reference to a lawyer named Feldman, also on the Committee, with whom I sensed he felt some allegiance and who had expressed sympathy with Sarnoff's point of view. He also stated that Feldman was on President Johnson's staff~ and I am oZ" the opinion that investigation might reveal that this is the Feldman who acts as an attorney for the NATD in Washington. December 8, 1964 Robert B. Walker U_._..._.